White v Express Newspapers

On a meaning application, the court must determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the publication read as a whole by the hypothetical reasonable reader. The court is not required to choose between the parties’ competing meanings.

Words alleging suspicion or investigation may convey reasonable grounds to suspect serious wrongdoing without alleging that the wrongdoing was actually committed. Exculpatory material must be considered with the defamatory material. Where the publication gives reasonable grounds to suspect that one person used insider information communicated by another to place winning bets, it may convey reasonable grounds to suspect dishonesty by both.

Two libel actions were brought by James White, a professional snooker player, and John Callaghan, described as his friend and fan, against Express Newspapers. The claims concerned hard-copy and online publications in the Daily Star Sunday headed “Jimmy’s aide in Betting Probe”.

The defendant applied under CPR Part 53 Practice Direction paragraph 4.1 for a determination that the words were incapable of bearing the meanings attributed to them. The parties agreed that meaning should be tried as a preliminary issue. The central questions were the natural and ordinary meaning of the article, whether it alleged fact or opinion, and whether it conveyed actual guilt or reasonable grounds for suspicion.

1. The court determined the meaning issue as a preliminary issue in both actions. The words complained of were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning.

2. Applying the principles summarised in Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130, the article had to be read as a whole. The hypothetical reasonable reader was neither naïve nor unduly suspicious, and the court had to avoid strained interpretation and over-elaborate analysis.

3. The article clearly fell short of alleging actual dishonesty or wrongdoing. Its dominant references were to suspicion and investigation, and it included exculpatory matters. Nevertheless, it conveyed that the newspaper’s investigation had produced grounds to suspect dishonesty.

4. Applying the levels of defamatory meaning explained in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 218; [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, the meaning was at the level of reasonable grounds to suspect, rather than actual commission of the suspected conduct. It was unnecessary to force every meaning into one of the usual categories, and the court was required to reach its own conclusion.

5. The meaning conveyed was that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that Callaghan had used insider information communicated by White to place winning bets, and therefore reasonable grounds to suspect that both men had acted dishonestly to enable those bets.

6. The allegation against White was not avoided by the possibility that Callaghan might have obtained information informally as a friend. That interpretation was over-analytical in the context of the article. The meaning was an allegation of fact, not opinion, consistently with the approach in Cammish v Hughes [2012] EWCA Civ 1655; [2013] EMLR 13.

7. The court recorded, without it affecting the meaning determination, that the WPBSA had subsequently stated that it had found no evidence of inappropriate betting activity and would take no further action.

First-instance determination of the meaning issue in two libel actions. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.