Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

[2014] EWHC 754 (Admin)

Summary

An adopted development plan is neither absent nor silent merely because site allocations remain incomplete. Relevant strategic policies may provide sufficient guidance to determine a proposal’s acceptability in principle. National planning policy operates within the statutory priority accorded to the development plan.

Housing land supply assessments involve planning judgment, but require robust calculations and clear reasons on potentially decisive disputed assumptions. A delivery discount is distinct from a housing supply buffer. Where claimed supply only marginally exceeds five years, failure to address a contested discount or explain its rejection can invalidate the decision. Choice of assessment method, buffer and the evaluation of prematurity generally remain matters for the decision-maker, subject to review for legal error.

Factual background

Bloor Homes East Midlands Limited, a housing developer, applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to challenge a planning inspector’s decision. The inspector, appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, had dismissed Bloor’s appeal against Hinckley and Bosworth Borough Council’s refusal of permission for 91 houses. The site lay in the Green Wedge between Groby and Ratby.

The adopted core strategy required further housing in Groby but restricted housing development in the Green Wedge. An emerging site allocations document favoured the site, while its allocation and the Green Wedge boundary remained under review. The inspector accepted a housing land supply of 5.02 years, including a 5% buffer, and found both environmental harm and prematurity.

Bloor challenged the treatment of development plan absence or silence, housing supply calculations, prematurity, Green Wedge considerations and sustainable development. A central question was whether the inspector had adequately addressed a disputed 10% discount for anticipated housing delivery on larger sites.

Held

  1. The application succeeded in part. The inspector’s decision was quashed and the planning appeal remitted to the Secretary of State for redetermination. Ground 2 succeeded concerning the disputed housing-delivery discount. The remaining grounds failed.

  2. Absence, silence and outdated policies were distinct concepts under paragraph 14 of the National Planning Policy Framework. An adopted plan remained present although an additional allocations document was unfinished. A plan was not silent where relevant policies sufficiently indicated whether a proposal was acceptable in principle. Policies 8 and 9 supplied that guidance: they identified Groby’s housing requirement and restricted housing in the Green Wedge. The inspector’s rejection of the absence-or-silence argument was apparent without a separate express statement.

  3. The Framework operated within the statutory duties under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. It was a material consideration and could not alter the development plan’s statutory priority. Policy interpretation was ultimately for the court; application and weight ordinarily belonged to the decision-maker. Tesco Stores v Dundee City Council [2012] P.T.S.R. 983 applied.

  4. The Framework prescribed neither the Liverpool nor the Sedgefield assessment method. The inspector reasonably selected Liverpool and adequately explained that choice. Other appeal decisions depended on their particular circumstances and required no separate explanation of departure. Selection of the buffer also involved planning judgment. The inspector could use 5%. He could confine his assessment to the requirement figures on which Bloor had ultimately agreed to rely.

  5. The 10% delivery discount was distinct from the buffer and was a main controversial aspect of housing supply. The inspector either confused it with the buffer or omitted it. With supply only marginally above five years, he had to explain his conclusion and its numerical consequence. Acceptance of the discount could affect paragraph 49, prematurity and the final planning balance. The outcome could not safely be regarded as inevitable. Alternatively, the reasons were obscure and the resulting prejudice substantial. The reasons standard in South Bucks District Council and another v Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1953 applied.

  6. Prematurity guidance required a contextual assessment of the proposal’s nature, scale and location and the emerging document’s stage. Substantiality was relative to the need being planned for. The inspector adequately explained the risk of pre-empting allocations and boundary decisions. His conclusions accorded with the guidance, although the housing-supply error might affect that assessment on redetermination.

  7. The inspector independently assessed Green Wedge harm and considered the changed evidence and emerging review. Their weight was for him. His environmental findings sufficiently conveyed his sustainability conclusion. A restrictive policy was not automatically inconsistent with the Framework because it lacked an express benefits exception. Consistency depended on the particular policies read in context. Whether Policy 9 would require different treatment if a housing shortfall were established remained unresolved.

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Appellate history

  • High Court (Administrative Court): In [2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) , the statutory challenge succeeded concerning the housing-delivery discount. The inspector’s decision was quashed and the planning appeal remitted to the Secretary of State for redetermination.
  • Secretary of State’s inspector: Following an inquiry in December 2012, dismissed the planning appeal by a decision letter dated 22 January 2013.
  • Hinckley and Bosworth Borough Council: Refused planning permission for 91 houses on the Green Wedge site, leading to the planning appeal.

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