TLM Company Limited v Bedasie and another

A final appellate tribunal should not review concurrent findings of fact made by two lower courts merely because an appellant seeks to reweigh evidence or reargue credibility. Departure requires special circumstances, such as a miscarriage of justice or a material error or omission in law or procedure capable of affecting the finding. The recognised instances are illustrative, so an unusual case may qualify, but the threshold remains stringent. Questions whether evidence could support a finding, and materially consequential admissibility issues, are legal questions. The value or weight of evidence alone is insufficient. An intermediate appellate court properly asks whether the trial judge was plainly wrong.

Lisa Bedasie brought negligence proceedings against the owner and driver of a truck, and its insurer, after a collision in which her husband was killed and another person was injured. The trial judge found that the truck had crossed into the motorcycle’s lane and entered judgment for the claimant.

The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago unanimously dismissed the owner’s appeal on 29 May 2012. The owner appealed to the Privy Council, seeking to reargue the evidence and complaining that the Court of Appeal had given insufficient reasons. The central issue was whether the Board should depart from its stringent practice concerning concurrent findings of fact.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed.
2. Concurrent findings of fact. The Board applied the practice restated in Devi v Roy [1946] A.C. 508. Where two courts have made concurrent findings of fact directly related to their final decisions, the Board does not review the evidence for a third time unless special circumstances justify departure. The practice applies to the judicatures whose final tribunal is the Board. It is not avoided merely because judges reached the same factual finding for different reasons.
3. Exceptions. Departure requires a miscarriage of justice or a material violation or neglect of a principle of law or procedure. The error must be capable of affecting the finding. Whether there is evidence on which a finding could be reached is a question of law, and admissibility is also a legal issue where it materially affects the finding. The value or weight of evidence is insufficient. The examples are illustrative, and an unusually exceptional case may justify departure.
4. Application. The complaints about the bridge, a supposed road hump, a piece of bone, speed, witness credibility and the blood-alcohol evidence did not establish any exception. Some matters were speculative or inadmissible, and the trial judge gave proper reasons for rejecting the defence witness’s evidence. There was ample evidence supporting the finding that the truck was in the eastbound lane.
5. Intermediate appeal. The Court of Appeal correctly applied the test of asking whether the trial judge was plainly wrong, as explained in Harracksingh v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] UKPC 3. Given the nature of the appeal, its brief reasons were adequate because they addressed the central issue and the evidence supporting the conclusion.

1. Privy Council. In [2014] UKPC 25, the Board dismissed the appeal.
2. Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. On 29 May 2012, the Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal from the trial judgment.
3. Trial court. On 17 December 2008, the trial judge found that the truck driver had caused the collision by driving into the wrong lane and entered judgment for the claimant against the defendants.