SA (Holland) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In assessing whether an immigration detainee’s serious medical condition can be managed in detention, the court may consider available treatment and evidence from responsible clinicians. A qualified expert report does not compel a finding of unmanageable illness where it is expressed in qualified terms. Under the Hardial Singh approach, the judge must assess the reasonableness of continued detention independently, rather than merely review the Secretary of State’s view. Appellate courts rarely interfere with such evaluative conclusions unless they conflict with primary findings, involve an error of law, or were not reasonably open on the evidence. Where neither proposed ground has a real prospect of success and no compelling reason exists, permission should be refused.

This was a renewed oral application for permission to appeal against a decision of Mr CMG Ockelton, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in the Administrative Court, on a claim that the applicant had been wrongfully detained for immigration purposes.

The proposed appeal alleged that the applicant’s mental illness made detention impermissible under paragraph 55.10 of the Secretary of State’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance. It also alleged that the judge had failed to apply the Hardial Singh approach independently and had instead focused on whether the Secretary of State could reasonably conclude that detention should continue. The central issue was whether either ground disclosed an arguable error, a real prospect of success, or another compelling reason for permission.

1. Application dismissed. Neither ground disclosed a real prospect of success or another compelling reason for granting permission.
2. Paragraph 55.10 of the Secretary of State’s Enforcement Instructions and Guidance treats persons with serious medical conditions that cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention as liable to detention only in very exceptional circumstances. The judge was entitled to proceed on the basis that the applicant’s condition was manageable in detention. The assessment could take account of available medication and the evidence of responsible health professionals who saw the applicant frequently.
3. The second report of Dr Taylor expressed concern that further detention was potentially likely to harm the applicant’s mental health, but did not state in unqualified terms that the condition could not be satisfactorily managed in detention. The evidence therefore did not compel a different conclusion. The approach adopted was consistent with the standard discussed in R(O) v SSHD, [2014] EWCA Civ 990 at [46].
4. Under the Hardial Singh approach, the judge must assess for himself whether continued detention remains reasonable in all the circumstances. Reading the judgment as a whole, the judge independently reviewed criminality, risk of further offending and risk of absconding, while also considering the reasonableness of the Secretary of State’s position.
5. The appellate court will rarely interfere with an evaluative first-instance conclusion unless it is inconsistent with primary findings, based on an incorrect understanding of the law, or was not sensibly open on the facts. That standard, identified in Muqtaar, [2012] EWCA Civ 1270, was not met.

Order: application dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2015] EWCA Civ 1447, Lord Justice Sales dismissed the renewed oral application for permission to appeal.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Christopher Clarke LJ had previously rejected permission on the papers. The applicant renewed the application orally.
• Administrative Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Mr CMG Ockelton, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, decided the wrongful-detention claim from which permission to appeal was sought. The judgment does not state the formal lower-court citation or order.