Hemley v Croydon Council

For a second appeal, permission requires either an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason. A compelling reason may exist where it is strongly arguable that the lower court erred in law by substituting its own view for that of a reviewing officer and interpreting the officer’s decision too technically. A review decision should be read benevolently as a whole. Material factual findings unsupported by the evidence may justify reconsideration where the outcome might have differed. Permission was granted without determining the merits.

Croydon Council decided under section 184 of the Housing Act 1996 that Hemley, although eligible and homeless, had no priority need. On review under section 202, the Council maintained that conclusion. Hemley appealed under section 204. Her Honour Judge Faber allowed the appeal and quashed the review decision, finding that two material factual findings were unsupported by the evidence. Floyd LJ refused permission for a second appeal on paper. The Council sought oral reconsideration. The issue was whether an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason, justified permission.

Permission granted. The application was for permission to bring a second appeal against the county court’s decision concerning a homelessness review.

1. Second-appeal threshold. Permission could be granted only if the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The court did not consider that the application raised an important point of principle or practice.
2. Compelling reason. There was nevertheless a compelling reason because it was strongly arguable that the county court judge had substituted her own view for that of the reviewing officer and had failed properly to consider whether the officer’s view was reasonable.
3. Interpretation of the review decision. It was also strongly arguable that the judge had adopted an overly technical approach to the language used by the reviewing officer. The decision should be interpreted benevolently and as a whole. On that approach, it was arguable that the officer had considered the diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome and had meant that there was no medical reason for the pain other than that syndrome.
4. Medical evidence and factual findings. It was arguable that the criticism of the officer’s reasoning about the need to use a stick and the respondent’s walking ability was excessively technical. The officer had been advised that she could walk independently with or without aids, although the evidence also referred to difficulty mobilising long distances. These issues were sufficiently arguable to require a second appeal.
5. The appellant’s concern that similar cases might come before the same court also supported the conclusion that there was a compelling reason. Permission to appeal was accordingly granted. The merits of the appeal were not decided.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2015] EWCA Civ 1519, Lord Justice Kitchin reconsidered the refusal of permission on paper and granted Croydon Council permission to bring a second appeal.
• Central London County Court: On 15 January 2015, Her Honour Judge Faber allowed Hemley’s appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 and quashed the Council’s review decision dated 29 July 2014.
• Earlier permission decision: Floyd LJ refused permission on the papers by order dated 5 May 2015. Croydon Council then requested an oral reconsideration.