Hough v Greathall Ltd

For opposition to a business tenant’s application under section 30(1)(f) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, the landlord’s intention to demolish or reconstruct must be established at the hearing. The same rule applies whether the application follows a landlord’s section 25 notice or a tenant’s section 26 request.

The amended wording of section 25(6) and (7) resulted from abolition of the counter-notice procedure. It did not require the landlord to prove that the relevant intention existed when notice was served. The notice identifies the ground of opposition and functions as a pleading to prevent surprise.

Greathall served a notice under section 25 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 terminating Richard Hough’s business tenancy and opposing a new tenancy on the ground that it intended to demolish and reconstruct the premises.

At the hearing on 29 May 2014, the Croydon County Court held that Greathall’s intention had to be assessed at the hearing and found the intention established. It dismissed Hough’s application for a new tenancy and ordered him to give up possession. The appeal concerned whether the amended wording of section 25 required the intention to exist at the date of the notice instead.

1. Appeal dismissed. McCombe LJ delivered the judgment, with Burnett and Vos LJJ agreeing. The landlord’s intention under section 30(1)(f) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 had to be proved at the hearing of the application.
2. The court followed the approach in Betty’s Cafés Limited v Phillips Furniture Stores Limited [1959] AC 20. Although that case concerned a tenant’s request under section 26, its reasoning established the hearing as the relevant time under section 30(1)(f). The same interpretation applied to proceedings initiated by a landlord’s section 25 notice.
3. The amendment to section 25(6) and (7) followed abolition of the tenant’s counter-notice procedure by the Regulatory Reform (Business Tenancies) (England and Wales) Order 2003/3096. The change from conditional to present wording removed an obsolete procedural feature. Nothing indicated an intention to alter the settled timing rule.
4. The landlord’s notice of opposition served the function identified in Betty’s Cafés: it stated the statutory ground and informed the tenant of the case to be met. It did not require proof that the landlord already possessed the relevant settled intention when notice was served.
5. The quality of the intention remained governed by Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] KB 237. It required more than contemplation: the landlord had to decide to bring about the works and have a reasonable prospect of doing so by its own act. That question was assessed at the hearing.
6. Dogan v Semali Investments Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1036 did not determine the amended issue because the section 25 notice in that case pre-dated the 2004 commencement of the new provisions. The availability of pre-action disclosure or correspondence did not justify a different rule, given the statutory time limits and practical nature of the proceedings.

1. Croydon County Court. On 29 May 2014, His Honour Judge Ellis held that Greathall’s intention under section 30(1)(f) had to be established at the hearing, found the ground made out, dismissed the application for a new tenancy and ordered possession.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The appeal was heard on 11 December 2014 and dismissed on 27 January 2015. The court upheld the hearing-date rule and the order below: [2015] EWCA Civ 23.