Thornhill v Cambridge City Council & Anor

For Schedule 2 development under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999, the development description and applicable threshold must be read together and in context. A scrap-metal yard is not an industrial estate development project under paragraph 10(a). Nor may a project expressly classified under paragraph 11(e) be re-categorised under a general description to avoid an unmet threshold. The environmental impact assessment regime concerns projects which may sensibly have significant environmental effects and must be applied with common sense. A minor change of use below the relevant threshold was therefore not EIA development.

The applicant challenged planning permission granted by Cambridge City Council on 20 December 2011 for a change of use from second-hand car sales to a car-hire business, with ancillary facilities, on land within a scrap-metal yard. Patterson J dismissed the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review, concluding that the claim was unarguable: [2014] EWHC 2616 (Admin). The appeal concerned whether the proposal was EIA development under the 1999 Regulations, particularly whether it was a change to or extension of an industrial estate development project or fell within the provision for storage of scrap iron, and whether associated land could satisfy the applicable threshold.

Appeal dismissed; application refused.

1. Regulation 2(1) of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999 required the proposal to fall within a description in Schedule 2 and, since the site was not in a sensitive area, to meet the applicable threshold or criterion in Column 2.
2. The descriptions in Column 1 and the thresholds in Column 2 had to be read together, in the context of the Regulations as a whole and the underlying purpose of the EIA Directive. They indicated the nature and size of projects likely to have significant environmental effects.
3. A scrap-metal yard could not sensibly be described as an industrial estate development project under paragraph 10(a). In any event, the lawful site was below the 0.5-hectare threshold. Alleged unlawful use of additional land for vehicle manoeuvring could not convert the lawful 0.4-hectare site into a qualifying project.
4. Paragraph 11(e), which expressly referred to storage of scrap iron including scrap vehicles as an other project, reinforced the conclusion that a scrap-metal yard was not an infrastructure project under paragraph 10. Whether or not the descriptions were mutually exclusive, a project expressly covered by a specific description could not avoid its applicable threshold by being re-categorised under a more general description.
5. The EIA regime was intended to apply to a limited number of projects capable of having significant environmental effects, not to every minor planning application. Applying the Regulations with common sense, the proposed change of use was nowhere near that category and the claim was unarguable.

Treacy and Bean LJJ agreed with Sullivan LJ.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal against Patterson J’s order dated 18 June 2014 was dismissed and the application was refused: [2015] EWCA Civ 340.
• High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division): Patterson J dismissed the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review, holding the claim unarguable: [2014] EWHC 2616 (Admin).