Curran v Collins

In a sole-name property case, beneficial ownership is presumed to follow the legal title. A claimant seeking a beneficial interest under a common-intention constructive trust must establish both a shared intention to confer such an interest and detrimental reliance upon that intention.

A reason given for excluding the claimant from the title does not necessarily imply an entitlement to a beneficial interest. Its objective meaning depends upon the parties’ words, circumstances and conduct. An appellate court should respect a trial judge’s credibility findings and multifactorial factual evaluations unless the judge was clearly wrong.

Ms Curran claimed beneficial interests in three properties bought and registered solely in Mr Collins’ name, including The Haven, and alleged that they were partners in a kennels business conducted there. There was no express agreement concerning ownership. Her case relied principally upon an explanation that adding her to the title would require the expense of another life insurance policy.

HHJ Marshall QC dismissed the property and partnership claims, finding no shared intention and no detrimental reliance. Ms Curran appealed, challenging the judge’s treatment of witness credibility, the explanation concerning title, the parties’ contributions, the alleged partnership and documentary disclosure. The central issues were whether the factual findings could be disturbed and whether the explanation objectively supported a common-intention constructive trust.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to find that Ms Curran had no beneficial interest in any property and was not a partner in the kennels business.

2. In a sole-name case, beneficial ownership is presumed to follow the legal title. The person asserting a different beneficial ownership bears the burden of proving it. To establish a common-intention constructive trust, the claimant must demonstrate a common intention that both parties should have a beneficial interest and detrimental reliance upon that intention.

3. The explanation that adding Ms Curran to the title would be too expensive did not establish a common intention. Its meaning had to be assessed objectively in the full factual context. When the Feltham house was acquired, the parties were not living together, it was not acquired as a joint family home, Ms Curran made no significant contribution and there was no positive representation that the property would otherwise have been acquired jointly.

4. Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 and Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 were fact-sensitive. In each, the parties were already living together in a family home and the legal owner positively represented that the property would have been placed in joint names but for the stated obstacle. Those decisions did not establish that merely giving a specious reason for excluding someone from the title necessarily, or usually, supports an inference of beneficial ownership.

5. The later will in Ms Curran’s favour did not materially assist her. At most, it contemplated her acquiring property upon Mr Collins’ death. It did not assure her of a present interest and could not have influenced the interests arising when the Feltham house was acquired six years earlier.

6. The judge’s unchallenged finding that Ms Curran had not acted to her detriment was independently fatal to the constructive-trust claim. Her factual findings also excluded both a direct interest in The Haven and an interest carried into it from the sale proceeds of the Feltham house.

7. An appellate court will rarely overturn credibility findings because the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses. It must also respect a multifactorial factual evaluation unless the judge was clearly wrong or reached a conclusion unavailable on the evidence. No such error was shown.

8. The finding that no partnership existed was adequately reasoned and could not be disturbed. In any event, partnership in a business would not, without more, confer an interest in premises bought by one partner alone with that partner’s money.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed by [2015] EWCA Civ 404. The court upheld the findings that the appellant had no beneficial interest in the properties and was not a partner in the kennels business.

• Central London County Court: By an order dated 24 May 2012, HHJ Marshall QC dismissed the appellant’s property and partnership claims. She separately ordered payment of £3,500 for the appellant’s undisputed interest in the Airedale terriers; that order was not appealed.