SA (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an asylum appeal based on risk to a lone Tamil woman, a tribunal must engage with the claimed risk through sufficiently detailed reasoning and enquiry. It may consider whether return would make the claimant anomalous or ostracised and whether family connections provide support. An appellate court cannot remake primary findings of fact merely because they differ from an expert report. Where the tribunal has considered the evidence, country guidance and relevant risk factors, and no arguable error of law is shown, permission to appeal should be refused. A materially different case involving an express finding of sexual violence does not require the same result.

The appellant, a Sri Lankan Tamil woman, entered the United Kingdom on a forged Canadian passport, claimed asylum, and was granted indefinite leave to remain after the claim was refused. The First-tier Tribunal found that she had no LTTE involvement, was not of interest to the authorities, and faced no relevant risk on return, including as a lone woman. The Upper Tribunal dismissed her appeal, finding no error of law. Permission to appeal was refused on paper, and the appellant renewed the application orally in the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the First-tier Tribunal’s treatment of alleged sexual violence, the risk to a lone vulnerable Tamil woman, expert evidence and country guidance disclosed an arguable error of law.

Application refused. Lord Justice Jackson held that the proposed appeal disclosed no arguable error of law and would undoubtedly fail.

1. The appellant’s alleged sexual assault was uncertain. She had no specific recollection and could not say whether an assault had occurred. Counsel identified no finding by the First-tier Tribunal that she had been a victim of sexual violence. PP (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1828 involved an express finding of rape in custody and pregnancy. Its factual background was materially different.
2. The First-tier Tribunal had considered the position of lone Tamil women in northern Sri Lanka in detail. It was entitled to find that a single-woman household would not be unusual or anomalous and to take account of the appellant’s relatives and available family support.
3. The appellant relied on the two-stage inquiry identified in Shah & Islam v SSHD [1999] UKHL 20. The First-tier Tribunal had, in substance, considered the asserted social group and the risk on return. Its reasoning and enquiry were sufficient.
4. A tribunal may make findings which coincide with some parts of an expert report and depart from other parts after hearing all the evidence. The Court of Appeal could not remake those primary findings. The tribunal was entitled to find that the appellant was not of interest to the authorities, was not on a stop or watch list, and had no perceived LTTE involvement. It had properly considered the country guidance.
5. There was no arguable error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision or in the Upper Tribunal’s dismissal of the appeal. Permission was refused. Granting permission would provide no benefit and would expose the appellant to substantial adverse costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission was initially refused on paper by Floyd LJ. On renewed oral application, Jackson LJ refused permission in [2015] EWCA Civ 605.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
• First-tier Tribunal: Found that the appellant was not at risk of persecution on return by reason of LTTE association or her status as a lone woman, and that she was not of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities.