Nizami v Dezyanian

A second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to entertain it. Mere disagreement with the lower court’s assessment of evidence or factual findings does not meet that threshold. Where earlier permission to appeal was limited to a particular issue, Access to Justice Act 1999, section 54(4) confines any renewed application to that issue.

The applicant landlord had granted the respondent an assured shorthold tenancy. The respondent succeeded in a housing disrepair claim, obtaining damages of £32,236.95. Applications to set aside the judgment and for permission to appeal were unsuccessful, save that permission was granted in relation to damages for the period January 2009 to December 2010. Her Honour Judge Guggenheim later refused permission on the remaining issues and reduced the damages for that period from £13,200 to £9,900. The applicant renewed his application before the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the proposed challenge to the period-three assessment satisfied the statutory threshold for a second appeal.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Scope of jurisdiction. Permission had previously been granted only in relation to the assessment of damages for January 2009 to December 2010. Judge Guggenheim refused permission on the remaining aspects of the dispute. Under section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, those matters were at an end. The renewed application could therefore address only the assessment for the third period.
2. Second-appeal threshold. The applicant had to show an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason why the Court of Appeal should entertain a second appeal. A complaint that the lower court reached the wrong factual conclusion, without more, does not satisfy that test.
3. Application of the test. The applicant argued that the award remained unjust because he had not received notice that repairs were required and had carried out the repairs once notice was given. This was merely a disagreement with the lower court’s findings. Those findings followed a rejection of his evidence. Judge Gerald had also recorded admissions concerning the disrepair, non-compliance with an injunction to repair, and the absence of evidence contradicting the independent surveyor’s compelling evidence.
4. Disposition. The proposed appeal raised no important point of principle or practice and no other compelling reason for a second appeal. Permission was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On the renewed application, permission to appeal was refused: [2015] EWCA Civ 632.
2. Central London County Court: Her Honour Judge Guggenheim refused permission on the remaining grounds and reduced the damages for January 2009 to December 2010 from £13,200 to £9,900.
3. Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Gerald refused permission except in relation to the assessment of damages for the third period.
4. Central London County Court: District Judge Jackson entered judgment for the respondent in the housing disrepair claim. District Judge Fine later dismissed the application to set aside that judgment.