A, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Rev 1)

Permission to appeal may be granted under the second limb of CPR 52.3(6) where another compelling reason exists, even if the claim is not considered to have a real prospect of success. Related cases may provide such a reason where their circumstances would assist the Supreme Court with a pending appeal on the same issue. Permission was granted for challenges involving a Sanctuary Scheme and a disabled child. An Article 8 ground was rejected as hopeless where no infringement of the right to respect for the home or unacceptable eviction risk was evidenced. The underlying Article 14 and Public Sector Equality Duty merits were not determined.

Two claimants sought permission to appeal after the Administrative Court rejected challenges to reductions in housing benefit under the Housing Benefit (Amendment) Regulations 2012. A’s case concerned a woman placed in a Sanctuary Scheme after serious violence and raised Article 14, Public Sector Equality Duty and Article 8 grounds. The High Court rejected her claim in [2015] EWHC 159 (Admin). In SR, grandparents relied on the needs of a disabled child living with them; Stuart-Smith J rejected their claim, but the citation is not stated in the judgment.

The Court of Appeal considered the relationship between Burnip and MA, and the pending Supreme Court appeal in MA. The central issue was whether permission should be granted, and whether A’s Article 8 ground was arguable.

1. Permission. Permission was granted in SR. In A, permission was granted on the Article 14 and Public Sector Equality Duty grounds, and the stay was lifted. Permission was refused on A’s Article 8 ground.
2. The challenges concerned housing-benefit reductions for accommodation regarded as larger than the tenant’s needs. The court noted that similar discrimination claims had produced different results in Burnip [2012] EWCA Civ 629 and MA [2014] EWCA Civ 13. Both decisions had applied the high hurdle of whether the justification was manifestly without reasonable justification. The apparent difficulty in reconciling the decisions was not resolved in these permission applications.
3. Under the second limb of CPR 52.3(6), permission could be granted where another compelling reason existed, even though the court did not regard the claims as having a substantial prospect of success in the Court of Appeal. The pending Supreme Court appeal in MA, and the assistance that the circumstances of the present cases could provide when that issue was considered, supplied such a reason.
4. Sir Stanley Burnton held that A’s Article 8 claim was hopeless. Her Article 8 rights in relation to her home had not been infringed, and there was no evidence of an unacceptable eviction risk capable of engaging those rights. Lord Justice Underhill agreed. He added that, even if MA had been rightly decided, the fine distinctions needed to reconcile it with Burnip might make the Article 14 claims arguable, but he considered it unnecessary to reach a concluded view.
5. The cases were to be listed in the Michaelmas term so that any further appeal could, if permission were granted, be heard with MA in the Supreme Court.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2015] EWCA Civ 772, permission was granted as stated above, the Article 8 ground was refused, and the stay in A was lifted.
2. High Court, Administrative Court — A’s claim was rejected by His Honour Judge Worster in [2015] EWHC 159 (Admin). SR’s claim was rejected by Stuart-Smith J; the citation is not stated in the judgment.