L (A Child), Re

In public law children proceedings, a further expert or parenting assessment should be ordered only where it is necessary to resolve the proceedings justly. The decision is a case-management decision, and an appellate court should intervene only on clear grounds. A threshold finding under Children Act 1989 section 31 may be based on pervasive neglect, including lack of stimulation, serious dental neglect, inadequate supervision and resulting developmental delay. A welfare decision may rely on the trial judge’s assessment of parental conduct, honesty, co-operation and realistic care options. The court need not accommodate diverse parenting standards where the care provided has fallen far below a safe level and the risks of return cannot be managed.

The mother appealed against HHJ Kevin Barnett’s final orders made on 7 November 2014 after extensive public law proceedings concerning L. The judge found pervasive neglect, significant developmental delay caused by neglect and lack of stimulation, serious dental decay and injuries caused by inadequate supervision. He concluded that L could not safely return to her parents, refused an application for a further parenting assessment, made a care order and authorised placement for adoption.

The appeal challenged the evidence and findings, the treatment of poverty and positive parenting evidence, the assessment of rehabilitation and flight risk, alternative care options, and the refusal to adjourn. It also raised the approach discussed in In the matter of B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 concerning diverse standards of parenting.

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. The care order and authorisation for placement for adoption therefore remained in force.

1. Further assessment. A further expert or parenting assessment should be ordered only where it is necessary to enable the proceedings to be resolved justly. The judge had more than sufficient evidence to evaluate L’s welfare and the available options, despite the deficiencies in the two existing assessments. The decision was a case-management decision, and the appellate court would be reluctant to interfere unless there were clear grounds. No such grounds existed. ([66], [116]-[118])
2. Parental capacity and rehabilitation. The judge was entitled to assess the parents’ ability to work with the local authority and the viability of the father becoming the primary carer from the evidence of their past conduct, their behaviour during the proceedings, their dishonesty and his own extensive observation of them. A formal assessment was not necessary where it would add no meaningful information. Strong and striking evidence would have been required before interfering with that assessment, but the evidence did not meet that standard. ([103]-[112])
3. Threshold findings. Under section 31 of the Children Act 1989, the judge was entitled to treat the serious dental decay as a separate form of significant harm caused by neglect. The condition had developed over a significant period, and its absence from earlier examinations did not prevent the finding. The judge was also entitled to conclude, on a high level of probability, that L’s developmental delay was caused by neglect and lack of stimulation, having regard to both the expert evidence and the evidence of the home environment. ([119]-[126])
4. Welfare and parenting standards. The case was not one involving a choice between tolerable or adequate models of parenting. The findings showed care falling far below a safe standard over a substantial period, together with a material risk of flight and an inability to manage the risks of return. The positive features of rehabilitation did not outweigh those risks. The comparison with In the matter of B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 therefore did not assist the parents. ([113]-[115], [128]-[130])

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 30 June 2015, the court unanimously dismissed the mother’s appeal. [2015] EWCA Civ 901
• Family Court, Chester District Registry: HHJ Kevin Barnett concluded the proceedings on 7 November 2014 by making a care order and authorising placement for adoption. No separate citation is stated in the judgment.