Styles, R v

For possessing a firearm with intent to commit murder, it is sufficient that the defendant had the murderous intent while possessing the firearm within the period charged. The intent need not have continued throughout an entire journey. A judge must not invite a jury to use previous misconduct as supporting the prosecution unless it has been admitted as bad-character evidence. Minor and dissimilar previous misconduct may require an effective or qualified good-character direction. A misdirection will not make convictions unsafe if, viewed overall, the trial remained fair and the evidence was compelling. In sentencing a young offender whose conduct resembled a planned attempted murder, substantial personal mitigation may make a lengthy determinate sentence manifestly excessive.

The applicant was convicted at Lewes Crown Court of possessing a loaded shotgun with intent to murder Michael Maddock and of threatening to kill him, intending that Chelsea Banks would fear that the threat would be carried out. He had sent threatening messages after the end of his relationship with Banks and was arrested near Maddock’s home carrying a loaded shotgun.

He appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge misdirected the jury on intention and character, and failed to reassure the jury that they were not under pressure of time. He also sought leave to appeal against a 12-year custodial sentence for the firearm offence. The central issues were the temporal scope of the required intention, the proper treatment of limited previous misconduct, the safety of the verdicts, and the proportionality of sentence.

1. Conviction appeal dismissed. For the offence under section 18(1) of the Firearms Act 1968, the prosecution had to prove that, while the applicant possessed the shotgun on 5 December 2013, he intended to commit murder. The judge correctly left open the possibility that this intent arose at any point during that period. It would have been wrong to require proof that it endured throughout the whole walk from Haywards Heath to Burgess Hill.
2. The judge nevertheless erred by telling the jury that the applicant’s minor previous matters and admitted misconduct could support the prosecution case. They had not been adduced as bad-character evidence through a statutory gateway. Given their limited and dissimilar nature, the applicant should have received either an effective good-character direction or a qualified direction on credibility and propensity, consistently with R v Gray [2004] EWCA Crim 1074.
3. The error did not render the convictions unsafe. The judge had substantially put the prior matters in their proper context, warned against giving them undue weight, and directed the jury to consider the considerable favourable character evidence. The threats, the loaded firearm, and the applicant’s proximity to the intended victim’s home made the prosecution case very strong.
4. The absence of an express reassurance about the jurors’ forthcoming commitments was not unsafe. There was no evidence of actual time pressure, and the verdicts were returned within the normal court day.
5. Sentence varied. The offending bore considerable similarity to a level-2 planned attempted murder, for which the applicable range was seven to 15 years’ custody and the starting point 10 years. The loaded firearm and proximity to the victim’s home aggravated the offending. However, the applicant’s youth, absence of serious previous offending, and exceptional emotional turmoil were substantial mitigation. The 12-year term was manifestly excessive and was replaced with 10 years’ custody on count 1; the concurrent sentence on count 2 was undisturbed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appeal against conviction, but varied the sentence by substituting 10 years’ custody on count 1.
• Lewes Crown Court The applicant was convicted on 30 January 2015 of offences contrary to section 16 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and section 18(1) of the Firearms Act 1968. On 29 May 2015, he received 12 years’ detention on count 1 and eight years’ detention concurrently on count 2.