Morgans, R v

A direction on voluntary intoxication need address its possible effect on specific intent only where intoxication is a live issue on the evidence. Directions must be assessed fairly and as a whole.

A defendant with convictions has no entitlement to a good-character propensity direction. If convictions are old, minor and irrelevant, the judge must consider effective good character. Otherwise, any direction is within the judge’s broad discretion.

A Lucas direction need not follow prescribed wording if, in context, it adequately identifies innocent reasons for lies and leaves the jury clear as to its task. Sentencing for arson with intent requires close attention to the individual offence and offender; suggested sentencing brackets do not impose an upper limit.

The applicant was convicted at Reading Crown Court of arson with intent to endanger life. He had set fire to petrol poured through the letterbox of an occupied house after its occupants had reported a collision involving him. He was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, consecutive to an existing sentence of three and a half years for conspiracy to burgle.

He sought extensions of time and leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. His conviction grounds challenged the directions on alcohol, good character and lies, and the fairness of the summing-up. His sentence grounds relied on mitigation and totality. The central questions were whether the summing-up rendered the conviction unsafe and whether the consecutive total was excessive.

1. The applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence were refused. Extensions of time were also refused.

2. The direction on alcohol did not render the conviction unsafe. Unlike R v Brown and Stratton, [1998] Crim LR 485, intoxication was not an issue at trial. The defence was alibi, and the applicant had not suggested that drink affected his conduct or thought processes. Read as a whole, the summing-up correctly required the jury to be sure that he deliberately started the fire intending to endanger life.

3. Under R v Hunter and Ors, [2015] EWCA Crim 631, a defendant with convictions is not entitled as of right to either limb of a good-character direction. Convictions that are old, minor and irrelevant require the judge to consider effective good character. In other cases, the judge has a broad discretion. The court declined to interfere with its exercise here. The approach in R v Gray, [2004] EWCA Crim 1074, had been disavowed on this issue, and R v Styles, [2015] EWCA Crim 1619, should not be relied on to seek such a direction.

4. The Lucas direction was adequate in the context of the summing-up. It identified panic, confusion and an attempt to bolster a true defence as possible innocent reasons for lying. The judge was entitled to remind the jury of the series of alleged lies relied on by the Crown. The summing-up was full, fair and even-handed.

5. The sentence was not excessive, whether considered alone or with the existing sentence. The judge had properly considered mitigation, dangerousness and the numerous aggravating features. The seriousness of arson with intent depends intensely on the individual facts; an asserted bracket of eight to ten years does not create a ceiling for more serious offending.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): applications for extensions of time and leave to appeal against conviction and sentence refused: [2015] EWCA Crim 1997.
• Crown Court at Reading: the applicant was convicted on 10 April 2014 of arson with intent to endanger life and sentenced on 13 June 2014 to eight years’ imprisonment, consecutive to an earlier sentence.