Uddin & Ors, R. v

An anti-social behaviour order requires demonstrated necessity. Each prohibition must be rationally connected to the particular risk of further anti-social conduct and proportionate to that risk, especially where it restricts religious manifestation, expression, assembly or association.

Conduct occurring in the background to an isolated violent episode does not, without more, justify restrictions on otherwise lawful religious proselytising or participation in demonstrations. Orders must be tailored to each offender and expressed with sufficient precision. Procedural fairness also requires clear and specific notice where the prosecution materially changes the allegations or evidence relied upon for an order.

Nine men appealed against three-year anti-social behaviour orders imposed at the Central Criminal Court after convictions arising from two incidents of public disorder in London. Their custodial sentences were not challenged.

The orders restricted association at demonstrations, public Da’wah and, for three appellants, conduct at demonstrations, protests and rallies. The appellants contended that the process was unfair, that the orders were unnecessary and disproportionate under the Convention, that their terms were unclear or overbroad, and that the judge had failed to consider their individual circumstances.

The central issues were whether the statutory necessity condition had been met and whether the restrictions were justified and proportionate.

1. Appeals allowed. The anti-social behaviour orders were quashed. Although the first two conditions in section 1C of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 were met, the orders had not been shown to be necessary for the protection of the public from further anti-social acts.

2. The proceedings were civil, but factual allegations relied on to establish anti-social conduct had to be proved to the criminal standard, or an equivalent civil standard: R (McCann and others) v Crown Court at Manchester [2002] UKHL 39. Necessity, however, was an evaluative judgment. The prosecution’s informal and substantial change to the basis of the applications left the appellants without clear notice of the allegations and evidence they had to meet. Given the serious consequences of an ASBO, that procedural unfairness alone required the appeals to be allowed.

3. The restrictions also failed on their merits. Necessity had to be demonstrated, and prohibitions engaging Convention rights had to be proportionate and commensurate with the risk guarded against: R v Boness [2005] EWCA Crim 2395. The Da’wah restrictions prima facie interfered with article 9. Peaceful public proselytising was merely the setting of the Oxford Street violence; it was not its cause, and there was no evidence of unlawful or disorderly Da’wah before or after that incident.

4. The association prohibition lacked evidence that the presence of any named person increased an appellant’s risk of anti-social conduct. The demonstration restrictions similarly lacked a sufficient connection to the disorder. Unauthorised status, burning items, flag-poles and ordinary approaches to members of the public did not justify the restrictions imposed.

5. The court further observed that ASBOs should be tailored to the individual offender. Personal history, prior conduct and each offender’s role were ordinarily highly relevant. Several terms were also unduly broad or unclear, including the definition of Da’wah and the expressions governing association at rallies. Those defects reinforced the conclusion that the orders could not stand.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2015] EWCA Crim 1918, allowed the nine appeals and quashed all anti-social behaviour orders.
• Central Criminal Court: On 23 January 2015, imposed three-year anti-social behaviour orders following convictions and sentences arising from public-disorder incidents. The custodial sentences were not challenged on this appeal.