Frimpong v Crown Prosecution Service

A Criminal Courts Charge is mandatory where the statutory conditions are met. The sentencing court has no discretion over its amount and must disregard the offender’s means and liability for the charge when sentencing.

A Crown Court may allow time to pay, but it cannot impose imprisonment in default or remit the charge. A circuit judge’s personal power under Courts Act 2003 section 66 does not convert the Crown Court into a magistrates’ court or permit it to bypass the statutory enforcement scheme. A charge cannot be treated as paid through a term of imprisonment imposed at sentence.

Frimpong v Crown Prosecution Service concerned an application for permission to appeal against the Criminal Courts Charge imposed following a guilty plea in the Crown Court to possessing false identity documents with improper intention.

The sentencing judge imposed six months’ imprisonment, an £80 statutory surcharge and a £900 Criminal Courts Charge. She initially purported to treat the charge as served by the imprisonment, but reopened the sentence and confirmed the £900 order. The appellant contended that, by exercising a district judge’s powers under section 66 of the Courts Act 2003, the judge could have used magistrates’ court enforcement powers to deem the charge paid by custody.

The central issue was whether that course was lawful.

1. Appeal dismissed. The £900 Criminal Courts Charge was mandatory following the appellant’s Crown Court conviction on a guilty plea. The court had no discretion as to either its imposition or amount. The offender’s means were irrelevant, and the charge had to be ignored when determining sentence under section 21A(4) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

2. The Crown Court could allow time for payment or instalments under section 141 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. It had no power to impose imprisonment in default under section 139, and it had no power to remit the charge. Remittal was for a magistrates’ court under section 21E of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, subject to its statutory restrictions.

3. Section 66 of the Courts Act 2003 gives a circuit judge the powers of a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) in criminal causes and matters. It does not cause the Crown Court to become a magistrates’ court. Consistently with R (W) v Crown Court at Leeds [2011] EWHC 2326, the provision could not be used where the matter remained before the Crown Court.

4. The judge could not specify herself as the magistrates’ court for enforcement under section 41 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970. An individual district judge is not a magistrates’ court, and that course would bypass Parliament’s prescribed enforcement mechanism. In any event, there had been no payment default, other enforcement methods had not been tried or considered, and section 82(1A) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 prevented a warrant of commitment based on the appellant’s immediate custodial sentence. Sections 135 and 136 provided no alternative route.

5. Except in the very rare case of an offender able to pay immediately, courts should allow time to pay. A practice of imposing immediate custody and, on the same occasion, treating a Criminal Courts Charge as discharged by imprisonment for non-payment is unlawful. As the appeal was unsuccessful, the court also imposed a £200 Criminal Courts Charge, with seven days to pay.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave was granted and the appeal against sentence was dismissed: [2015] EWCA Crim 1933.
• Inner London Crown Court: HHJ Karu imposed six months’ imprisonment, an £80 statutory surcharge and a £900 Criminal Courts Charge. After reopening the sentence, the judge confirmed the £900 charge rather than treating it as discharged by imprisonment.
• Camberwell Green Magistrates’ Court: The appellant first appeared and the case was sent to the Crown Court.