Clarke, R. v

The sufficiency of indictment particulars is governed by whether they make clear the conduct alleged by the prosecutor. A count need not plead every ingredient of the substantive offence where the offence is correctly stated and the particulars give reasonable notice of the case to be met. Poor drafting which causes no uncertainty does not make an indictment a nullity.

Identification evidence remains admissible where its substantial probative value outweighs prejudice arising from incidental disclosure of previous imprisonment. That prejudice may be removed by the manner in which the evidence is presented and by a clear jury direction. The bad-character procedure does not apply where the prosecution does not rely on a previous conviction as bad-character evidence.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook of conspiracy to rob and was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that he organised or participated in robberies at a dwelling and at bookmakers’ premises.

He appealed against conviction, with leave of the Single Judge. The first ground challenged the particulars in the conspiracy count, which alleged an agreement to rob a dwelling and business of cash and other items. The second challenged the admission of identification evidence from a prison officer who recognised him from prior contact while he was imprisoned.

The central issues were whether the indictment was invalid for failing to allege force or fear, and whether the recognition evidence should have been excluded because it risked revealing a previous conviction.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The conviction was safe. There was ample evidence of the appellant’s involvement in the conspiracy.
2. Section 3 of the Indictments Act 1915 required a statement of the offence and particulars giving reasonable information about the charge. Under Part 14.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules, the current question was whether the particulars made clear the prosecutor’s allegation. The count correctly alleged conspiracy to rob, and the particulars made the prosecution case clear. It was unnecessary to set out every ingredient of robbery, including the use of force or putting a person in fear. The reference to robbing a dwelling rather than a person was a serious drafting error, but did not invalidate the count.
3. The court explained R v McNeill (unreported, 28 April 1998) as a decision which must have involved prejudice on facts not disclosed in its short judgment. It did not establish that the standard form of a robbery count was invariably a nullity. The approach in R v Graham [1997] 1 Cr App R 302 remained applicable: technical drafting errors do not make a conviction unsafe, unless the pleaded particulars could not in law support conviction of the charged offence.
4. The prosecution did not adduce the appellant’s previous imprisonment as bad-character evidence. There was therefore no basis for an application under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The recognition evidence was highly probative. Its potential prejudice could be avoided by neutral questioning and, if disclosure occurred, by a suitable direction. The trial judge’s ruling admitting the evidence was correct, and the eventual disclosure in cross-examination did not render the conviction unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in [2015] EWCA Crim 350, dismissed the appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook — convicted the appellant of conspiracy to rob and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment.