Dann, R. v

A guilty plea is not rendered improper merely because a defendant feels pressure from a Crown proposal that may benefit a co-accused. Where the Crown makes or endorses the proposal solely on its assessment of the public interest in the prosecution as a whole, and the defendant receives proper and careful legal advice, the plea remains a free choice. The pressure created by the prospect of protecting a close relative or partner does not itself invalidate the plea. A proper guilty plea also closes a later challenge to the merits of the prosecution.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Plymouth Crown Court to conspiracy to blackmail. The prosecution alleged that, while on remand in prison, he and others threatened another prisoner to force repayment of a debt owed to his associate.

On the day fixed for trial, the Crown indicated that it would not proceed against two co-defendants if the appellant and another co-defendant entered acceptable guilty pleas. One of those co-defendants was the appellant’s partner and the mother of his two young children. The appellant pleaded guilty, while stating that he was innocent and felt unable to risk her conviction and imprisonment.

His subsequent application to vacate the plea was refused. He appealed against conviction, contending that the Crown’s proposal had exerted improper pressure and made the conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The guilty plea was not improperly induced, and the refusal to vacate it was correct.
2. The court derived from R v Herbert (1992) 94 Cr App R 230 that pressure arising from a possible advantage following a guilty plea does not necessarily make the plea unlawful. A plea following a proposal made or endorsed by the Crown is not vulnerable for improper pressure where the proposal reflects Crown counsel’s judgment of the public interest in the prosecution as a whole, including the cases against other defendants.
3. That principle assumes that the defendant has received proper and careful advice from counsel. The appellant had received such advice, including that he should plead guilty only if guilty. The fact that the proposal affected his partner and their children did not deprive him of a free choice.
4. There was no basis for finding that the Crown’s proposal was motivated by anything other than a proper assessment of the public interest. The fact that the prosecution, rather than a co-defendant, initiated the proposal did not materially distinguish R v Herbert. The reasoning in R v Najera was consonant with this conclusion: pressure where a close relative is a co-accused is not improper absent a cynical or improper prosecutorial purpose.
5. The later material concerning conversations involving the complainant’s father could not advance the safety challenge. The merits of the prosecution were closed by the appellant’s proper guilty plea.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2015] EWCA Crim 390, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction.
• Plymouth Crown Court: The appellant pleaded guilty on 4 August 2014. His application to vacate that plea was refused on 9 October 2014. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on 19 December 2014.