RG v R.

Verdicts on specific and specimen counts are not inconsistent merely because the jury acquits on the specific counts. The appellate question is whether the verdicts can plausibly be explained by a fair-minded jury’s reasoning on the evidence. The significance of acquittals depends on the relationship between the allegations and the directions given.

A judge may give both a direction under section 34 and a lies direction where they concern distinct evidential matters. An aggregate sentence for several escalating offences is not excessive merely because it exceeds the guideline range for a single offence.

The applicant was convicted at Woolwich Crown Court of five offences of sexual activity with a child, contrary to Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 9. The convictions included specimen counts alleging continuing oral and vaginal penetration. He received concurrent sentences producing a total of eight years’ imprisonment.

He renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence after refusal by the Single Judge. The proposed conviction grounds included alleged inconsistency between acquittals on specific counts and convictions on specimen counts, fresh evidence, bad-character cross-examination, jury directions, disclosure, and decisions not to discharge the jury. The central question was whether any matter rendered the convictions arguably unsafe.

1. Leave to appeal against conviction was refused. The acquittals on particular allegations and convictions on specimen counts were not logically inconsistent. The governing question was whether the verdicts could plausibly be explained by a line of reasoning open to a fair-minded jury. Unlike R v S [2014] EWCA 927, the specimen counts were not unsupported additions to a case based on individual incidents. They formed the substance of an allegation of continuing and escalating offending. The judge’s answer to the jury’s question properly required separate consideration of the specific allegation while preserving its duty to consider the specimen count.
2. The judge’s directions on the prison letter were fair and comprehensive. The proposed fresh evidence concerning the date of the wardrobe incident could not affect the safety of the convictions under Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s 23(2)(b). The incident was peripheral evidence of clandestine contact, whereas the complainant’s evidence concerned multiple alleged acts of sexual activity.
3. The limited cross-examination of M concerning the earlier Snaresbrook proceedings was initially capable of bearing on credibility. In any event, the judge firmly directed the jury that those earlier proceedings gave no assistance in assessing M’s evidence in this trial. No resultant unsafety arose.
4. The direction under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 34 was justified by the applicant’s failure in interview to mention the alleged threat. A separate lies direction concerning the letters was within the judge’s discretion. The decisions to discharge only the connected juror, and not the whole jury, were proper. The remaining complaints about prejudicial material, disclosure and investigation were either addressed by sufficient directions or lacked any evidential basis.
5. Leave to appeal against sentence was also refused. Although the applicable guideline range concerned a single offence, the judge sentenced for five offences of escalating seriousness. The total of eight years was appropriate and was not shown to exceed the guideline approach.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2015] EWCA Crim 715, refused renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
• Crown Court at Woolwich: Following jury trial, convicted the applicant on five counts of sexual activity with a child. Concurrent sentences were varied to produce a total of eight years’ imprisonment.
• Single Judge: Refused leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.