K v K

Applications cannot be used to re-litigate matters already determined. A party seeking to reopen concluded issues must identify a material change since the last hearing or fresh evidence that was previously unavailable and gives the matter a different complexion. Newly discovered material must bear materially on the order challenged. Allegations of adultery will ordinarily have no impact on financial, children or protective orders unless the circumstances are very unusual or extreme. Where repeated applications are totally without merit, the court may reinforce an existing restriction under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 and make a Grepe v Loam order controlling future applications.

The parents’ financial proceedings had concluded with a consent order requiring the father to pay the children’s school fees. Earlier proceedings concerning the children had resulted in orders dismissing the father’s applications, granting protective injunctions, and restricting further applications under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989.

The father made further applications concerning the financial order and the children. He relied on alleged adultery, documents concerning related litigation and funding, and his arrest and subsequent charge for an alleged breach of the non-molestation order. The central issue was whether these matters justified reopening issues previously determined.

1. The applications were dismissed. The father’s committal application concerning alleged perjury was struck out after he confirmed that he did not wish to pursue it. Directions were given for the mother’s separate committal application.
2. A party seeking to reopen matters already concluded must show a material development since the last hearing, or fresh evidence that was unavailable at that time and places the matter in a different light. The father failed to satisfy either requirement. His allegations of blackmail and duress were known before the previous hearing. The emails relied on as evidence of adultery did not establish any relevant basis for reopening the financial or children orders.
3. The alleged adultery, even if proved, did not materially affect the consent financial order, the children proceedings or the protective injunctions. The mother’s litigation with a third party did not breach or undermine the financial order. Documents concerning her ability to fund litigation had no relevant bearing on the applications. The father’s arrest and charge under sections 42A(1) and (5) of the Family Law Act 1996 could not justify varying or discharging the orders.
4. The repeated attempt to re-litigate concluded matters was totally without merit. It demonstrated the continuing need for the existing section 91(14) restriction and justified a corresponding restriction concerning the financial matters. The judge directed that a Grepe v Loam order be drafted, reserving future applications, including applications for permission to apply, to the President of the Family Division unless released to another judge.