Asghar & Anor v Ahmad & Ors

In a defamation claim, the claimant must first establish the defamatory meaning of the words and then prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant was responsible for their publication. Qualified privilege depends on sufficient reciprocity between the publisher’s interest and the recipient’s interest. Incidental communication to others may remain privileged where it cannot reasonably be avoided. Privilege is defeated by malice, including an improper motive or lack of honest belief in the truth of the publication.

Joint liability for republication requires proof that the defendant intended to encourage, and did encourage, the republication. Damages must compensate separately for each publication, although repetition of the same words may cause less harm. Judgment was entered against the defendant responsible for the actionable republications, while the claims against the other defendants failed for lack of proof of responsibility.

The claimants brought proceedings for defamation arising from three groups of publications concerning the ownership and governance of two mosques in Newport: an update circulated around a public meeting, a dossier supplied to individuals, and material published on a website.

The defendants denied responsibility and relied, in different respects, on qualified privilege and other defences. The fifth defendant’s part of the claim was adjourned for separate determination. The central issues were whether the words were defamatory, which defendants were responsible for their publication, whether privilege applied, whether republication created joint liability, and the appropriate damages.

1. Defamatory meaning. The court applied the ordinary and natural meaning of the words. The publications conveyed allegations of personal benefit from mosque property, fraud, corruption, improper political conduct and disruptive behaviour. They were defamatory of both claimants.
2. Responsibility for publication. Responsibility had to be proved against each defendant, individually or jointly, on the balance of probabilities. The evidence did not establish that the first, second or third defendants authored or published the update or dossier. The fourth defendant was found to have compiled and published the dossier to Andrew Davies.
3. Qualified privilege. The mosque meeting involved sufficient reciprocity between the defendants’ interest in explaining governance concerns and the congregations’ interest in receiving that information. Any attendance by persons without the relevant interest was ancillary and unavoidable. The privilege would have protected the first defendant’s oral presentation because he honestly believed what he said and had no improper motive. The fourth defendant could not rely on privilege because he was motivated by a desire to injure the claimants and lacked an honest belief in the more extravagant allegations.
4. Joint liability for republication. Supplying the dossier to the fifth defendant did not, by itself, establish liability for website publication. It did so here because the fourth defendant knew of the fifth defendant’s practice of posting derogatory material, intended to encourage republication, and in fact encouraged publication of the dossier’s contents.
5. Damages and disposal. The earlier award against the newspaper publishers did not extinguish the claim against the fourth defendant. Each publication had to be assessed separately, although republication of the same words might cause less harm. The serious allegations, local audience, prolonged website publication, and the fourth defendant’s conduct justified an award of £45,000 to each claimant. Judgment was entered against the fourth defendant with an injunction restraining further publication. The claims against the first, second and third defendants were dismissed.

First-instance judgment. The judgment records an earlier judgment awarding damages against the publishers of the Nawa-i-Jang article, but no appellate history of the present proceedings is stated.