NTC & Ors v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

Under section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, the question is whether the person who used force acted reasonably in the circumstances as they appeared when the force was used. Defects in planning, briefing or communication do not, without more, deprive that person of the statutory defence. Where a jury has found the individual officers’ force reasonable, liability cannot be established against their employer on a joint-tortfeasor theory based only on an earlier operational mistake. Obiter observations in Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police did not provide a basis for avoiding the binding approach in Farrell v The Secretary of State for Defence.

The claimants sued the Commissioner after armed police entered the wrong flat during an operation to arrest a suspected firearms offender. They alleged assault, trespass and false imprisonment. A jury found that the officers’ use of force on the balcony was reasonable under section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, and that the entry was justified by the officers’ purpose and reasonable grounds. It rejected the alleged restraint and further assault inside the flat.

The claimants then argued that, despite the verdict, the Commissioner was liable because officers responsible for accurate information had contributed to the mistake and all officers acted pursuant to a common design. The central issue was whether that argument could circumvent the statutory defence.

1. Judgment for the defendant. The jury found that the individual officers used reasonable force in the circumstances in assisting the arrest of a suspected offender. The defence under section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 therefore succeeded: [2015] EWHC 1432 (QB), paras 31–32.
2. The claimants’ joint-tortfeasor argument could not succeed merely because correct information about the suspect flat had been available to other officers and a communication or operational error led to the wrong flat being identified. The statutory defence is directed to the person who used the force. The relevant question is whether that force was reasonable in the circumstances in which it was used, rather than whether the operation was defectively planned: Farrell v The Secretary of State for Defence was binding, and its ratio applied, paras 24–28, 31–35.
3. The observations relied on from Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police, concerning the possible relevance of the source of a mistake and the ability of a chief constable to rely on inaccurate briefing, were obiter. They arose in a case involving pleaded and admitted negligence and did not establish the joint-tortfeasor proposition advanced here, paras 18–23, 29–30.
4. The court rejected the suggested distinction of Farrell v The Secretary of State for Defence. Although the facts differed, the House of Lords’ reasoning applied directly. Once the jury had answered the relevant questions in the defendant’s favour, liability could not be reconstructed through the employer’s responsibility for the wider operation, paras 33–35.

There must be judgment for the defendant, para 36.