Duff, R (on the application of) v The Master, Fellows and Scholars of the College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity Within the Town and University of Cambridge of King Henry VIII's Foundation & Ors

[2015] EWHC 1605 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2015] EWHC 1605 (Admin) · [2015] CN 1069
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
12 June 2015
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Public law Judicial review—irrationality and fettering discretion
Keywords
judicial review vehicle-keeper data reasonable cause accredited trade association irrationality fettering discretion abdication of power trespass parking charges Data Protection Act 1998
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

The Secretary of State may adopt a policy governing the exercise of the discretionary power to disclose vehicle-keeper data where an applicant must show reasonable cause. It is rational to require membership of an accredited trade association where the applicant’s activities are materially similar to private parking enforcement and the policy aims to promote fair treatment, appropriate standards and independent appeals.

Such a requirement is not an unlawful rigid pre-condition or abdication of statutory judgment. It does not remove the court’s jurisdiction to assess damages for trespass. A business model’s reduced profitability, or the applicant’s existing regulation in another capacity, does not make the policy unlawful.

Factual background

The claimant, a certificated bailiff operating ProServe, sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse further disclosure of vehicle-keeper data unless ProServe joined an accredited trade association. ProServe acted for landowners seeking to deter and recover sums arising from unauthorised parking and trespass, including on large commercial sites.

The claimant challenged the decision on irrationality, unlawful pre-conditions, abdication of statutory power and Data Protection Act 1998 grounds. The central issue was whether it was lawful and rational to apply the Secretary of State’s accredited trade association policy to ProServe and its clients.

Held

  1. The claim was dismissed. The Secretary of State had lawfully exercised the discretion under regulation 27(1)(e) of the Road Vehicles (Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2002.
  2. Regulation 27(1)(e) created a discretion, not an entitlement, to disclose information to a person who could satisfy the Secretary of State that there was reasonable cause. The Secretary of State was entitled to adopt a policy governing that discretion. A person seeking disclosure for enforcement by improper means might have a cause, but not a reasonable cause.
  3. The classification of ProServe as falling within the category of private car park enforcement companies was rational. Although ProServe sought to prevent parking rather than operate car parks, its business materially involved enforcement against trespass, warning signs, fixed charges, charge notices and no independent appeals process. The similarities outweighed the differences.
  4. The accredited trade association requirement was regulatory rather than punitive. It was rationally directed to fair treatment of motorists and the maintenance of industry standards. The fact that ProServe had not previously misused data, or was regulated as a certificated bailiff, did not address the matters requiring regulation.
  5. The requirement did not unlawfully fetter the statutory discretion or amount to an abdication of power. Nor did it oust the court’s jurisdiction to assess damages for trespass. Approval by an appeal body could influence the assessment, but the court would remain responsible for determining damages.
  6. The Data Protection Act 1998 ground failed on the facts. The decision was not based on a misconceived fear that disclosure would breach that Act. Data protection considerations were relevant to the policy, including because some vehicles involved personal data.

The Secretary of State was entitled to change the policy. The claimant was ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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