Kolodziej v Regional Court in Lublin (Poland)

Specialty is a fundamental principle of extradition, but a requested person bears a heavy burden in alleging breach where extradition operates between trusted European partners. Translation errors in extradition information must be assessed realistically. An aggregation of sentences following convictions before an earlier extradition did not amount to a fresh trial, particularly where the requested person sought the aggregation, participated in the hearing and was represented. For the statutory passage-of-time bar, delay caused substantially by the requested person’s offending, failure to maintain contact with the authorities and refusal to waive specialty was not oppressive. Extradition will interfere with family life under Article 8, but refusal requires exceptionally serious consequences outweighing the public interest in giving effect to extradition obligations.

The appellant challenged a decision of District Judge Purdy at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 23 April 2015 ordering his extradition to Poland to serve a sentence of two years and six months for offences committed in 2002 and 2003. He alleged breach of specialty arising from the aggregation of sentences while he was imprisoned in Poland after an earlier extradition. He also relied on delay under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 and interference with family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issues were whether specialty had been breached, whether surrender had become oppressive, and whether family considerations made extradition disproportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Polish Judicial Authority had not breached specialty. The reference in its further information to a “trial” was treated as a translation error; “hearing” was the appropriate term. The court was required to allow for the effects of translation in extradition cases, applying the approach in Fofana and Belise v Deputy Prosecutor Thubin, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Meaux, France [2006] EWHC 744 (Admin).

2. The appellant had already been convicted and sentenced for the relevant offences before his earlier extradition. He had himself applied for the sentences to be aggregated, participated in the hearing and was represented by a lawyer. He later refused to waive specialty, and that right was respected. The aggregation therefore did not constitute a trial in breach of specialty.

3. The delay was unfortunate but did not make surrender oppressive under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. Much of the delay resulted from the appellant’s continued offending, failure to maintain contact with the Polish authorities after changing residence, and exercise of his specialty rights. His offending had not ceased, and the age of the offences did not by itself make extradition unjust.

4. Article 8 was engaged because of the appellant’s wife and child. The District Judge had incorrectly assumed that the appellant had assaulted his wife, whereas he had been acquitted of that allegation and convicted of assaulting her friend. That error did not alter the result. There was no current evidence of exceptional family consequences capable of outweighing the public interest in extradition. The relevant approach was applied from Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin).

5. The seven months spent in custody did not require release or prevent extradition. Any decision concerning release during the Polish sentence was for the Polish court.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal against the order of District Judge Purdy at Westminster Magistrates’ Court dated 23 April 2015.