London Borough of Redbridge v SNA

The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to protect children must be exercised within constitutional and statutory limits. It cannot support injunctions protecting unspecified and unidentified classes of children who are not subjects of proceedings. The jurisdiction is protective, but not unlimited, and local authorities must satisfy the leave requirements in Children Act 1989, section 100(4). Sexual Risk Orders provide a statutory route for restrictions designed to protect the public, children or vulnerable adults. The court may accept undertakings beyond its specific powers where they further the central objectives of the relevant litigation, but it was inappropriate to invite such undertakings where they were extraneous to both the applicable legislative framework and the inherent jurisdiction.

The London Borough of Redbridge applied for leave to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction against SNA, following findings in care proceedings that he had systematically groomed and sexually abused his stepdaughter. The authority sought wide-ranging injunctions preventing SNA from contacting, approaching, associating with, or living with any female under 18, including children not identified in the proceedings.

The application relied on Birmingham City Council v Sarfraz Riaz and Others [2014] EWHC 4247 (Fam), in which similar protective orders had been made. The central issue was whether the inherent jurisdiction extended to unnamed children who were neither known nor subject to proceedings, particularly after the statutory introduction of Sexual Risk Orders.

1. Scope of inherent jurisdiction. The inherent jurisdiction is amorphous and versatile, but it is not unlimited. Because it is not based wholly on statute or common law, it must be used sparingly and consistently with its development, the constitutional role of the court, and the separation of powers.
2. Protection of identified children. The jurisdiction has been used to protect or promote the best interests of an identified child or vulnerable adult. The practice direction and section 100 of the Children Act 1989 focus on the child who is the subject of proceedings and on likely significant harm to that child. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant injunctions for unspecified children generally.
3. Earlier authority. The court respectfully disagreed with the approach in Birmingham City Council v Sarfraz Riaz and Others [2014] EWHC 4247 (Fam) only on this point. The protective objective was understandable, but extending the inherent jurisdiction to children neither known nor subject to proceedings exceeded its proper parameters. The reasoning in Re M (children) [2015] EWHC 1433 (Fam) was understood as addressing the jurisdiction in the context of individual children.
4. Statutory alternative. Section 122A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, as amended, provides for Sexual Risk Orders. The criminal courts were the appropriate venue because Parliament had defined the statutory criteria, publicity issues were handled differently, and the police were better equipped to monitor compliance.
5. Undertakings. Although the court had accepted interim undertakings restricting SNA’s contact with females under 18, it concluded that they did not further the objectives of the applicable legislative framework or fall within the inherent jurisdiction. The undertakings were discharged.

First instance decision. The judgment records an earlier fact-finding hearing in care proceedings before HHJ Sapnara, but no appellate decision in the present application.