Southend-On-Sea Borough Council v Meyers

The inherent jurisdiction may protect a capacitous adult where coercion, undue influence or other disabling circumstances prevent a genuinely free and informed decision. Vulnerability is descriptive, not determinative, and a disability such as blindness does not by itself justify intervention.

Any interference with autonomy must be necessary and proportionate. An order restricting where and with whom an adult may live does not necessarily deprive that person of liberty. The court must assess the individual’s concrete situation, including the type, duration, effects and implementation of the measures. Protection may be achieved by restricting accommodation choices while leaving physical liberty intact.

Southend-on-Sea Borough Council applied under the inherent jurisdiction for declarations that it had discharged its duties under the Care Act 2014 and the Human Rights Act 1998. The application concerned a nearly 98-year-old man who had capacity to decide where and with whom to live but whose return home with his son exposed him to serious neglect and danger.

Earlier orders had required him to live in a care home and prevented his return home. The central issues were whether the inherent jurisdiction could intervene despite his capacity, whether the proposed protection would breach Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention, and whether the Council had discharged its statutory and human-rights obligations.

1. Inherent jurisdiction. The court adopted the principles summarised in Re DL [2012] EWCA Civ 253. The jurisdiction remains available to protect vulnerable adults, including capacitous adults, where they are under constraint, subject to coercion or undue influence, or otherwise disabled from making a free and genuine choice. It must be used sparingly and with proper regard to autonomy.
2. Being a vulnerable adult is not sufficient by itself. The description in Re SA [2005] EWHC 2942 is descriptive rather than definitive. Mr Meyers’s blindness did not itself establish vulnerability. His vulnerability arose principally from the dysfunctional and emotionally dependent relationship with his son, which impaired his ability to make a rational and informed decision about living arrangements.
3. The intervention was justified under Article 8. Returning home with his son, without appropriate care, created a real risk to Mr Meyers’s life and health. Restricting the relationship and excluding the son from the accommodation was necessary and proportionate, despite the serious interference with personal autonomy.
4. Article 5. The court applied the concrete-situation approach in Guzzardi v Italy 7367/76 Chamber Judgment and De Tommaso v Italy [2017] ECHR 2017. The assessment depends on the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measures, not merely their purpose. The proposed order did not confine Mr Meyers to a care home or otherwise deprive him of physical liberty. It restricted accommodation choices while leaving a range of living options, including returning to his bungalow with suitable care if his son was excluded.
5. The declaration sought by the Council was refused. The Council had not discharged its responsibilities. The preferred solution was Mr Meyers’s return home with appropriate support, subject to his son’s exclusion, while the Council should promote safe and constructive family contact and consider injunctive relief against the son.

• High Court (Family Division): Earlier interim protective orders were made on 10 December 2018. The Council’s application for declarations that it had discharged its duties was refused in [2019] EWHC 399 (Fam).
• Court of Appeal: Permission to appeal the interim orders was sought on 21 December 2018 and dismissed.
• High Court: Earlier proceedings included injunctions granted by Moor J on 30 March 2017 and a declaration granted on 5 June 2018.