Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council v PR & Ors

The inherent jurisdiction may protect a wider class of vulnerable adults, including on an interim basis while capacity and vulnerability are investigated. Intervention must remain necessary, proportionate and subject-focused. An injunction against the vulnerable adult herself should generally be granted only where she is likely to understand its purpose and terms, appreciate the consequences of breach, and be amenable to enforcement. A local authority should address those matters before seeking injunctive relief. A restriction on residence may amount to a deprivation of liberty, although no deprivation was established on the facts. Without-notice orders should permit an immediate application to vary or discharge them.

The Local Authority applied under the inherent jurisdiction concerning PR, a capacitous but vulnerable adult who had experienced a significant deterioration in mental health and was expected to return to live with her parents. Interim orders restricted PR’s residence and contact with her parents, and later restricted the parents’ contact with her. The proceedings also involved confidentiality, disclosure and possible deprivation of liberty.

By the hearing before Cobb J, PR had moved to alternative accommodation, the parties had agreed arrangements for future contact, and the substantive proceedings no longer required determination of the allegations. The court nevertheless reviewed whether the inherent jurisdiction had properly been invoked, whether an injunction should have been made against PR, whether the order deprived her of liberty, and what guidance should be given for future cases.

1. Disposition. The parties’ written agreement and the Local Authority’s continuing statutory safeguarding duties meant that no further substantive order was required. The proceedings were brought to an end.
2. The inherent jurisdiction extends beyond adults lacking mental capacity or unable to communicate a decision. It may be used to protect a wider class of vulnerable adults and may be exercised on an interim basis where there is evidence of vulnerability and an urgent need for protection while proper inquiries are made. On the evidence available on 25 March 2019, the interim protective order was permissible and the alternative statutory remedies did not provide equivalent protection.
3. The court should guard against protective intervention becoming counterproductive or abusive of the subject’s dignity and autonomy. The first without-notice order was appropriately limited by a short return date.
4. A restriction preventing a person from living where she wishes may amount to a deprivation of liberty, but PR had acquiesced in moving to the alternative accommodation and was not shown to have been deprived of liberty. Had there been a deprivation, the judge would have been reluctant to endorse it under the inherent jurisdiction. The interim period was also within the period contemplated in Winterwerp v The Netherlands [1979] EHRR 387.
5. The order against PR herself should not have been made. An injunction is an equitable remedy in personam and must serve a useful purpose with a real possibility of enforcement. On the evidence, PR was confused, possibly coerced and affected by mental disorder, so the court could not confidently regard a breach as deliberate or enforce the order meaningfully. Before seeking such relief, a local authority should evidence whether the subject is likely to understand the injunction’s purpose, receive knowledge of it, and appreciate the effect of breach.
6. A person served with or notified of a without-notice order should be able to apply immediately to vary or discharge it, after informing the applicant’s solicitors. A longer notice requirement improperly impedes access to justice.
7. The disclosure issue was not determined. If contested injunctive relief or fact-finding had proceeded, the respondents’ Article 6 rights would have required effective and fair participation. Non-disclosure remains exceptional, must be convincingly and compellingly justified, and must go no further than strict necessity; safeguards may sometimes reconcile disclosure with Article 8 rights.

First-instance proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court concerning a vulnerable adult. No appeal was determined in the judgment.