Obar Camden Ltd v The London Borough of Camden

A planning officer’s report must fairly and sufficiently draw the committee’s attention to the legal approach and material considerations relevant to the application. Where development affects a listed building or its setting, the authority must comply with section 66 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 by giving special regard to preservation. Heritage significance must also be assessed where required by policy. A report is unlawful if it materially misleads the committee by omitting material expert concerns about noise. A committee resolution expressed in detailed terms does not permit officers to rewrite the approved conditions; material amendments require the application to be returned to the committee. The claim succeeded and the planning permission was quashed.

The claimant operated a nightclub and music venue adjoining premises for which the defendant local planning authority granted permission for retail, office and residential uses, including eight flats. The claimant sought judicial review of the permission.

The challenge concerned the adequacy of the officer’s report on designated heritage assets and noise, the failure to report the application back to the committee after material changes to the conditions, the rationality of the noise conditions, and compliance with statutory requirements governing planning applications. The central issues were whether the authority had lawfully assessed heritage and noise impacts and whether the permission could properly be issued in the form adopted.

1. Ground 1 succeeded. The officer’s report was sufficient in relation to section 72(1) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, because it addressed the character and appearance of the conservation area. However, it failed to draw the committee’s attention to section 66 and the need to give considerable importance and weight to preserving the listed building or its setting. The members’ general planning experience did not cure that omission.
2. The report also failed to identify the significance of the affected heritage assets, contrary to paragraph 128 of the NPPF and the applicable local requirements. These were material considerations which had not been considered. The decision was therefore flawed under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004.
3. Ground 2 succeeded. The report stated that the proposed mitigation would resolve the noise concerns, but omitted the environmental health officer’s material concerns about patron noise from the Purple Turtle and traffic noise. The report therefore significantly misled the committee about material matters which remained uncorrected before the decision.
4. Ground 3 succeeded. The committee’s resolution specified the conditions to which permission was subject. It did not leave those conditions at large or authorise officers to replace them with materially different conditions. The officers therefore had to return the matter to the committee before making the changes. Independently, the application should have been referred back because new material expert concerns had arisen and the approved conditions were regarded as inadequate.
5. Ground 4 succeeded. The claimant’s technical evidence provided a detailed and systematic basis for alleging that the noise conditions could not fulfil their stated protective purpose. In the absence of any substantive response from the authority, the challenge crossed the high threshold applicable to a Wednesbury challenge involving planning judgment.
6. Ground 5 failed. The court accepted that the Camden Local Area Requirements for Planning Applications were requirements under section 62(3), rather than “provision” made under section 62(1) and (2). Section 327A therefore did not require the authority to refuse to entertain the application at that stage.
7. The court rejected the submission that relief should be withheld because the outcome would probably have been substantially the same. The planning permission dated 6 January 2015 was quashed. The defendant was ordered to pay the claimant’s costs of £35,000.

First-instance judicial review in the High Court (Administrative Court). The planning permission granted by the defendant was quashed.