Couves, R (On the Application Of) v Edinburgh House Estates Ltd

Where a planning committee resolves in principle to grant permission subject to negotiation, an officer may complete the decision-making process under concurrent delegated powers unless the committee expressly or necessarily removes that authority. The officer may assess whether the negotiated obligations are satisfactory and whether later considerations justify reconsideration or refusal.

The principle in R v South Cambridgeshire DC ex p Kides requires material changes arising before grant to be considered by the decision-maker. A change is material in this context only if it could affect the decision. Guidance that an officer should refer matters back for safety does not create an independent legal requirement where the changes could not realistically alter the outcome.

The claimant, secretary of a civic society, sought judicial review of Gravesham Borough Council’s grant of planning permission to Edinburgh House Estates Ltd for a major mixed-use redevelopment in Gravesend.

The Regulatory Board had resolved in April 2013 to permit the application, subject to planning conditions, referral to the Secretary of State and negotiation of a section 106 agreement. Council officers subsequently negotiated the agreement and issued permission in May 2014. The claimant argued that the officer lacked authority to issue permission without a further express delegation or reconsideration by the Board, that material changes had not been properly considered, and that the original resolution was affected by defective legal advice.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Council’s delegation arrangements gave the Regulatory Board and officers concurrent planning powers, subject to specified reservations. The Board’s consideration of the application temporarily prevented the officer from proceeding, but its resolution restored the officer’s ability to continue the decision-making process unless the Board expressly or necessarily imposed a limitation. No such limitation was found.
2. The resolution was properly understood as a decision in principle to grant permission, leaving officers to negotiate the section 106 agreement and conditions. The officer was entitled to decide whether the result was satisfactory and whether later material considerations justified refusing permission or referring the matter back. Reporting that agreement had been reached before permission was issued was sufficient in the circumstances.
3. The officer lawfully gave significant weight to the Board’s resolution. The negotiated obligations remained principally as presented to the Board. Adjustments concerning community facilities, highways, phasing, financial contributions and affordable housing reflected the viability and negotiating context explained in the reports and did not constitute significant changes.
4. The officer considered the later matters relied upon, including the Bluewater extension, the emerging Core Strategy, Ebbsfleet Garden City and the proposed Paramount Theme Park. None could reasonably have altered the Board’s conclusion. The advice concerning the risk of costs on an appeal did not invalidate the resolution or the later decision. The members had the reports and planning advice, and were entitled to decide whether reasonable planning grounds for refusal existed.
5. The principle in R v South Cambridgeshire DC ex p Kides required material changes before grant to be considered. The changes here were not material in the relevant sense because they could not affect the outcome. The further guidance in R (Hinds) v Blackpool Borough Council concerned a safety approach, not an additional legal requirement.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.