Hein v The Regional Court In Opole, Poland

An extradition bar based on passage of time requires the requested person to show that extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the delay. A person responsible for the delay by fleeing, concealing his whereabouts or deliberately evading arrest cannot rely on that bar. On an appeal against an extradition decision, the question is whether the lower court made the wrong decision. Where the lower court has conducted the required Article 8 balancing exercise, an appellate court should not interfere merely because the case was finely balanced. The interests of children are a primary consideration, but they do not necessarily outweigh the public interest in giving effect to extradition arrangements. Statutory proportionality requirements must also be addressed independently.

Piotr Hein appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision of District Judge Goldspring at Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordering his extradition to Poland under an accusation European Arrest Warrant. The warrant concerned five alleged fraud offences committed in 2002.

Before the District Judge, Mr Hein relied on the passage-of-time bar under section 14, his Article 8 rights under section 21, and the independent proportionality bar under section 21A. Permission to appeal was granted after the District Judge had described the Article 8 issues as finely balanced and because Mr Hein had not been legally represented. The central issues were whether he was responsible for the delay and whether the District Judge had reached a legally erroneous or disproportionate conclusion.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge was entitled to find that Mr Hein was a fugitive. The evidence showed that he knew of the prosecution, failed to comply with the obligation to notify the Polish prosecuting authorities of changes of address, failed to attend the hearing and hid from the prosecution. The District Court’s earlier decision revoking a preventive travel restriction did not undermine that finding. A person responsible for delay by fleeing, concealing his whereabouts or deliberately evading arrest cannot rely on the section 14 passage-of-time bar.
2. The District Judge had properly considered the relevant Article 8 authorities and conducted the required balancing exercise. The appellate question was whether the decision was wrong, not whether the appellate court would have struck the balance differently. The allegations were serious and a custodial sentence was likely. The District Judge had taken account of the children’s interests as a primary consideration, Mr Hein’s blameless life in the United Kingdom, his family life and the hardship caused by extradition.
3. The public interest in honouring international extradition obligations was reduced to some extent by the delay, but the delay was attributable to Mr Hein. The family circumstances did not outweigh that public interest so as to make extradition disproportionate.
4. For section 21A(3), the alleged conduct was grave, the likely penalty was not inconsiderable, and there was no evidence that the Polish authorities could adopt a less coercive measure than extradition. The statutory proportionality bar therefore did not apply.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Goldspring ordered extradition on 19 June 2015.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission to appeal was granted by Cranston J. The appeal was dismissed by Supperstone J.