First Capital East Ltd v Plana & Anor

An acquittal on criminal charges arising from the same facts is not an absolute bar to permission to bring committal proceedings for contempt. The court must exercise its discretion by balancing the public interest in punishing false statements in civil proceedings against the finality of litigation and the risk of requiring a second tribunal to decide the same allegations on the same evidence. Permission will generally be inappropriate unless, for example, material evidence was unavailable to the criminal court or important new evidence has emerged. Applications for permission should be made urgently, particularly where the alleged contempt arose in County Court proceedings.

The applicant sought permission under CPR 81.18(3) to bring committal proceedings against a claimant and his son. They had supported a personal injury claim with statements of truth alleging serious disability and a need for constant care. The County Court struck out the claim as fraudulent and ordered repayment of interim payments.

The first respondent was subsequently acquitted of fraud at Southwark Crown Court. The applicant nevertheless relied substantially on the same evidence to seek permission for contempt proceedings against both respondents. The central issue was whether the criminal acquittal prevented, or should in the exercise of discretion prevent, the proposed committal proceedings.

1. The application for permission was refused against both respondents. The first respondent’s acquittal was not an absolute legal bar, but it was a highly significant consideration in the discretionary decision.

2. Contempt proceedings and criminal proceedings serve different purposes. Contempt proceedings mark the court’s disapproval of conduct affecting its procedures and may secure future compliance, whereas criminal proceedings punish criminal misconduct and protect the public. Accordingly, the fact that contempt proceedings have been dealt with first does not ordinarily bar a later criminal prosecution, as explained in CPS v Tweddell [2001] EWHC Admin 188.

3. The court adopted the factors identified in Barnes t/a Pool Motors v Seabrook [2010 EWHC 1849 (Admin)], including the strength and significance of the case, the public interest, the likely effect of the statements, delay, and the need to avoid vindictive or oppressive proceedings.

4. The competing considerations were the public importance of punishing deliberate false statements made to obtain financial gain and the principle that the same allegations should not ordinarily be litigated twice. Applying the approach to double jeopardy discussed in R v J(JF) [2013] EWCA Crim 569, the court held that the answer lay in discretionary case management rather than in a plea of autrefois acquit.

5. On the evidence, permission would invite the committal judge to reach a different conclusion from the jury on the same allegations, using substantially the same evidence and the same standard of proof. That was unattractive and no sufficient purpose for further proceedings had been shown. The same reasoning applied to the son, whose alleged false statement could not be established without implicating the father’s account.

6. The judgment stressed that applications should be made without delay. It suggested that County Court cases should be referred to the High Court immediately and fast-tracked. The possible need for procedural reform was noted, since section 118 of the County Courts Act 1984, as amended, did not empower County Court judges to grant permission of this kind.