Summers v The City and County of Cardiff

For personal injury claims, the limitation period runs from the later of accrual of the cause of action and the claimant’s date of knowledge. Knowledge does not require certainty. It is sufficient that the claimant knows the relevant facts with enough confidence reasonably to justify preliminary steps towards proceedings. An injury is significant by reference to quantum alone. An asbestos-related pleural condition is significant when it produces more than very minor symptoms, regardless of the precise medical label applied to it. Where a claimant knows that an asbestos-related condition causes breathlessness or chest pain, the limitation period may begin before a later diagnosis gives the condition a more specific name.

The claimant sought damages for respiratory injury caused by negligent and statutorily wrongful exposure to asbestos during employment by the defendant’s predecessor. The defendant admitted exposure and breach of duty, but pleaded that the claim issued on 18 August 2014 was barred under the Limitation Act 1980.

The claimant had experienced breathlessness and chest pain from 2000. He knew that he had pleural abnormalities, that they were attributable to asbestos exposure at the defendant’s premises, and that the symptoms were caused by that asbestos-related condition. The central issue was whether he had the requisite knowledge of a significant injury before 18 August 2011.

1. Claim dismissed. The claimant’s date of knowledge for the purposes of sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980 was well before 18 August 2011. Judgment was entered for the defendant.
2. Under section 11(4), where proceedings are issued more than three years after the cause of action accrued, the claimant generally bears the burden of showing that the requisite knowledge was acquired within the relevant three-year period. Knowledge under section 14 does not mean certainty. It means sufficient confidence reasonably to justify preliminary steps towards proceedings.
3. The significance of an injury under section 14(2) is assessed by quantum alone. The threshold is low and is generally satisfied by an injury more than very minor. The cause or medical nature of the injury is not part of that assessment.
4. The court rejected an arid distinction between pleural plaques and diffuse pleural thickening on the evidence. The claimant had a single, progressing asbestos-related pleural condition. Its precise label was less important than whether it was symptomatic. His breathlessness and chest pain in 2000 were more likely than not partly caused by that condition, and were more than very minor symptoms.
5. The claimant had known in 2000 that he had pleural abnormalities, that they were attributable to asbestos exposure at work, and that his symptoms were caused by that condition. The fact that he did not pursue the earlier claim, and might reasonably have chosen not to do so, did not postpone the date of knowledge.