A (Appellant) v Hoare (Respondent)C (FC) (Appellant) v Middlesbrough Council (Respondents), X (FC) and another (FC) (Appellants) v London Borough of Wandsworth (Respondents) (Conjoined Appeals), H (FC) (Appellant v Suffolk County Council (Respondents),Young (FC) (Appellant) v Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and others (Respondents)

An intentional trespass to the person causing personal injury is an action for damages for breach of duty within section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980. It therefore attracts the three-year personal injury regime, the date-of-knowledge provisions and the equitable discretion under section 33.

Under section 14(2), significance is judged by an impersonal standard applied to the injury facts actually known or imputed under section 14(3). The claimant’s intelligence, character and psychological inhibition do not alter that standard. Those matters belong under section 33, where the court must weigh the reasons for delay against prejudice and the practical possibility of a fair trial.

Six appeals arose from claims concerning sexual assaults or abuse committed many years before proceedings began. In A v Hoare, C v Middlesbrough Council, H v Suffolk County Council and X and Y v Wandsworth London Borough Council, the lower courts treated intentional assault claims as governed by the six-year period in section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980, following Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498. The relevant Court of Appeal decisions included [2006] EWCA Civ 395 and [2004] EWCA Civ 1746.

In Young v Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and the Home Office, the trial judge found the date of knowledge to be within three years of proceedings but indicated that section 33 relief would otherwise have been refused. The Court of Appeal, in [2006] EWCA Civ 1534, reported at [2007] QB 932, held that knowledge arose much earlier and upheld the hypothetical refusal of relief.

The central questions were whether intentional personal injury claims fell within section 11, how a significant injury should be assessed under section 14(2), and how psychological inhibition and trial prejudice should be treated under section 33.

1. Disposition. Lord Hoffmann delivered the leading speech. Lord Walker, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown agreed with it; Baroness Hale agreed with the disposition and principal conclusions while expressing doubts about the wording of section 14(2). The House unanimously allowed all six appeals.

2. Intentional trespass. Per Lord Hoffmann, the expression negligence, nuisance or breach of duty in section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980 extends to an intentional trespass to the person causing personal injury. Parliament reused in the 1975 reforms language which had already received that broad construction. It could not rationally have intended to deny victims of intentional injury the more favourable date-of-knowledge and discretionary regime. Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 was wrongly decided and had generated anomalies and artificial pleading. The House departed from it and reaffirmed the approach in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232.

3. Significant injury. Per Lord Hoffmann, supported expressly by Lord Carswell and Lord Brown, section 14(2) imposes an impersonal standard. The court identifies what the claimant actually knew about the injury, adds any knowledge imputed under section 14(3), and asks whether a reasonable person with that knowledge would consider the injury sufficiently serious to justify proceedings against a solvent defendant who admitted liability. Intelligence, character, circumstances and psychological inhibition do not alter that standard. Mr Young knew in 1977 that he had been seriously assaulted, and his injury was then significant. Baroness Hale considered the statutory language capable of supporting a more claimant-specific approach, but agreed that no plausible construction placed his date of knowledge within three years of proceedings.

4. Section 33. Per Lord Hoffmann and Lord Carswell, the effects of abuse upon a claimant’s ability to commence proceedings belong in the unfettered discretion under section 33. The reasons for delay may carry substantial weight, but must be balanced against prejudice and the possibility of a fair trial. Lord Brown added that vicarious-liability claims may present narrower factual disputes than systemic-negligence claims. The court should examine when a complaint was made, the available records, any conviction, and whether the defendant retains a fair opportunity to investigate.

5. Orders. A v Hoare and H v Suffolk County Council were remitted for section 33 decisions. The orders which the trial judge would have made were entered in C v Middlesbrough Council. X and Y received the agreed damages of £57,500 and £70,000 respectively. Young was remitted for a fresh exercise of the section 33 discretion.

1. House of Lords: The House unanimously allowed all six appeals, departed from Stubbings v Webb, entered final orders where the findings or agreed damages permitted, and remitted A, H and Young for section 33 determinations.
2. Court of Appeal — [2006] EWCA Civ 395: The court, in a decision reported at [2006] 1 WLR 2320, upheld the application of section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 to the relevant intentional assault claims in A, H and X and Y.
3. Court of Appeal — [2004] EWCA Civ 1746: The court upheld the dismissal of C’s claim as barred by section 2 despite the trial judge’s findings on abuse, vicarious liability, damages and the section 33 discretion.
4. Court of Appeal — [2006] EWCA Civ 1534: In Young’s appeal, reported at [2007] QB 932, the court reversed the trial judge on the date of knowledge and declined to disturb his hypothetical refusal of section 33 relief.
5. Trial courts: The claims were struck out or dismissed under section 2 following Stubbings v Webb, except that Young initially succeeded on date of knowledge. Several trial judges also determined negligence, vicarious liability, damages or the hypothetical exercise of section 33.