Adamson and others v Paddico (267) Limited

When land has wrongly been registered as a town or village green, lapse of time is relevant but does not itself bar rectification under section 14 of the Commons Registration Act 1965. The statutory question is whether rectification is just. The better analogy is with laches: the court should consider knowledge, acquiescence and detriment or prejudice.

Prejudice may affect local inhabitants, other individuals, public authorities or the fairness of determining the original registration issue. It must rest on evidence or solid material from which an inference can be drawn. Mere speculation, an assumed public interest in finality or a predetermined period of delay is insufficient. The longer the delay, however, the easier it may be to infer prejudice.

These conjoined appeals concerned land which had been wrongly registered as town or village greens. In the Betterment proceedings, Morgan J ordered rectification under section 14 of the Commons Registration Act 1965: [2010] EWHC 3045 (Ch). The Court of Appeal dismissed the inhabitants' appeal: [2012] EWCA Civ 250.

In the Paddico proceedings, Vos J ordered rectification after finding that the statutory locality requirement had not been met: [2011] EWHC 1606. The Court of Appeal allowed the inhabitants' appeal by a majority because it considered the delay excessive: [2012] EWCA Civ 262.

The Supreme Court was concerned only with the relevance of lapse of time when deciding whether it was just to rectify the register. The correctness of the findings on use “as of right” and locality was not in issue.

1. Disposition. Lady Hale delivered the judgment of the court, with which Lord Neuberger, Lord Sumption, Lord Toulson and Lord Hodge agreed. Mrs Taylor's appeal in the Betterment proceedings was dismissed. Paddico's appeal was allowed and Vos J's order for rectification was restored.

2. Section 14 of the Commons Registration Act 1965 prescribes no limitation period and contains no presumption either for or against rectification. Its question is simply whether rectification is just. Although the register serves public purposes, good administration points both towards public reliance on a conclusive register and towards keeping the register accurate and lawfully compiled. The statutory inquiry principally concerns justice between the applicant and the local inhabitants.

3. Where the applicant is the landowner, the starting point is that an erroneous registration has severely curtailed the owner's rights and given the inhabitants rights which they should not have had. Lapse of time remains material. The closest analogy is the equitable doctrine of laches, which generally requires knowledge of the relevant facts together with acquiescence or detriment or prejudice. A purchaser's knowledge of registration and acquisition at a discounted price do not ordinarily remove the harm caused by the curtailment of ownership.

4. A landowner does not acquiesce merely by failing to prevent recreational use after registration. Registration is conclusive evidence of the inhabitants' rights until rectified, so the owner has no right to prevent that use. Acquiescence may carry greater weight where someone other than the owner seeks rectification, although relevant public interests may still point towards correction.

5. Detriment or prejudice will usually be central. Relevant categories include prejudice to local inhabitants, to others who made decisions in reliance on registration, to public authorities and the public they serve, and to the fair determination of historic use. An inference of prejudice requires solid material; speculation and assumptions are insufficient. A longer delay may nevertheless make a supported inference easier.

6. In Betterment, there was no evidence or proper basis for inferring significant prejudice during the period between registration and the rectification application. In Paddico, an earlier application had been made, the law had remained in flux, and no specific prejudice to inhabitants was established beyond loss of recreational rights. Refusal would prejudice the landowner, the former owner under its overage agreement, and the public interest in land allocated through planning procedures for housing. Rectification was therefore just in both cases.

• United Kingdom Supreme Court: Dismissed Mrs Taylor's appeal from [2012] EWCA Civ 250. Allowed Paddico's appeal from [2012] EWCA Civ 262 and restored Vos J's rectification order.
• Court of Appeal — Betterment: Dismissed the inhabitants' appeal from Morgan J's order: [2012] EWCA Civ 250.
• High Court — Betterment: Morgan J ordered rectification: [2010] EWHC 3045 (Ch). An earlier ruling that section 14 required a full rehearing was upheld by the Court of Appeal in [2008] EWCA Civ 22.
• Court of Appeal — Paddico: By a majority, allowed the inhabitants' appeal and refused rectification: [2012] EWCA Civ 262.
• High Court — Paddico: Vos J ordered rectification: [2011] EWHC 1606.