R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales, Ex parte Caswell (Caswell v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal)

An application for leave to seek judicial review must be made promptly and, in any event, within three months. A failure to meet either requirement constitutes undue delay for section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, even where good reason justifies extending time for the leave application.

The grant of leave therefore does not prevent the court from later refusing substantive relief where relief would cause the statutory hardship or prejudice, or would be detrimental to good administration. Good administration is an independent, context-sensitive interest. Relevant considerations include finality, elapsed time, the extent of the challenged decision's effects and the consequences of reopening it. The applicant's hardship remains relevant when the court exercises its ultimate discretion.

The appellants were dairy farmers whose exceptional-hardship milk quota for one farm was calculated by reference to the 70 cows expected to be milked at the end of the first quota year. The tribunal did not allow for the farm's future capacity of 150 cows and incorrectly suggested that another application might be possible. The appellants did not learn of judicial review until more than two years after the tribunal's decision.

Popplewell J held that the tribunal had erred in law. He granted a declaration but, because of undue delay and detriment to good administration, refused certiorari and mandamus. The Court of Appeal dismissed the farmers' appeal: [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1089.

The issues before the House were how Order 53, rule 4 interacted with section 31(6) and (7) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, whether granting substantive relief would be detrimental to good administration, and whether the judge's discretion should be disturbed.

1. Disposition. Lord Goff of Chieveley delivered the leading speech. Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner and Lord Lowry expressly agreed with his reasons. The House unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal's order.

2. Undue delay. Per Lord Goff, Order 53, rule 4(1) limits the time for applying for leave by requiring an application to be made promptly and, in any event, within three months. Good reason empowers the court to extend that period. It does not alter the objective conclusion that a failure to comply constitutes undue delay for section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The conclusion in Reg. v. Stratford-on-Avon District Council, Ex parte Jackson [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1319 was approved and applied.

3. Continuing discretion after leave. Per Lord Goff, the grant of leave after an extension of time does not preclude the court from subsequently refusing leave or substantive relief under section 31(6). The court may do so if relief would probably cause the specified substantial hardship or prejudice, or would be detrimental to good administration. Section 31(6) supplies independent grounds for refusing relief; it does not itself limit the period within which an application may be made.

4. Good administration. Per Lord Goff, detriment to good administration is independent of hardship or prejudice to third parties. No precise definition should be attempted because the need for finality varies with context. The interest includes a regular flow of consistent and reasonably prompt decisions, and citizens' ability to arrange their affairs in reliance upon those decisions. Relevant matters include the time elapsed, the extent of the decision's effects and the impact of reopening it. The public-interest reasoning in O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 was approved.

5. Application and discretion. Per Lord Goff, successful substantive relief was likely to encourage a significant number of further applications and require finite quota allocations to be reopened for several earlier years. That was precisely the kind of detriment contemplated by section 31(6). Popplewell J had considered the appellants' financial hardship and all relevant factors before balancing them against good administration. No error justified appellate interference with his refusal of substantive relief.

1. House of Lords: In R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales, Ex parte Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738, the House unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal's order.
2. Court of Appeal: The court dismissed the appeal against the refusal of substantive relief. Lloyd L.J. delivered the judgment, with which Kerr and Butler-Sloss L.JJ. agreed: [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1089.
3. High Court: Popplewell J held that the tribunal had erred in law. He granted a declaration but refused certiorari and mandamus because of undue delay and detriment to good administration.
4. High Court—leave stage: Mann J granted leave to apply for judicial review while observing that the appellants would have to address their delay at the substantive hearing.