A v Iorworth Hoare

Claims arising from intentional sexual assault are subject to the non-extendable six-year limitation period under Limitation Act 1980 section 2, rather than the extendable regime under section 11. The Court of Appeal was bound by Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498. A limitation defence accrued when the statutory period expired, so section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 could not retrospectively remove it. The same limitation classification applies to a claim against a public authority based on vicarious liability for deliberate trespass. Binding authority also prevented the claimants from recasting the abuse or failures to report it as breach-of-duty claims. However, an off-premises assault may be closely connected with a teacher’s employment where the teacher has pastoral responsibility for the pupil.

Three appeals were heard together. A appealed from the High Court decision dismissing her appeal against the striking out of her claim against a convicted sexual offender. H appealed from the Southend County Court’s dismissal of claims against Suffolk County Council arising from abuse by a teacher. X and Y appealed from the Mayor’s City of London County Court’s dismissal of claims against the London Borough of Wandsworth arising from abuse by their head of year.

The claims were brought outside the relevant six-year period. The central issues were whether the claims could be brought within the extendable limitation regime, whether the Human Rights Act 1998 altered the result, and whether the school authorities were directly or vicariously liable for the teachers’ conduct.

1. All appeals dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that it was bound by Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 to treat claims arising from deliberate sexual assault as subject to the six-year period in section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980. The period ran from accrual, or from the claimant’s eighteenth birthday where the claimant was then a minor. Section 11 did not apply, and section 33 could not extend the period.
2. The defendants acquired an accrued right to plead limitation when the period expired. The fact that limitation had to be pleaded, and had not yet been pleaded when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, did not alter that conclusion. Section 3 could not retrospectively deprive the defendants of the accrued defence. The court therefore made no declaration of incompatibility.
3. The court rejected the proposed distinction between individual perpetrators and public authorities. Where liability against the authority rested on vicarious responsibility for deliberate trespass, the claim remained outside section 11. Under KR v Bryn Alyn Community [2003] EWCA Civ 85 and C v Middlesbrough Borough Council [2004] EWCA Civ 1746, the deliberate abuse could not be recast as a breach-of-duty claim, or as a claim based on the teacher’s failure to report his own conduct, in the absence of independent systemic negligence.
4. For vicarious liability, the question was whether the wrongful conduct was sufficiently closely connected with the employment to be regarded as occurring in its course. The judge was wrong to treat the fact that Y’s abuse occurred away from school as decisive. The teacher’s pastoral responsibilities, the trust placed in him and the connection between those responsibilities and the conduct were sufficient to satisfy the close-connection inquiry.
5. The court nevertheless dismissed H’s factual appeal. The trial judge was entitled to find that the Council had not negligently recruited, supervised or monitored the teacher, applying the standards and evidence of the time. In X and Y, separating the non-assaultive conduct from the assaults would have required an artificial assessment of damages. The court therefore dismissed the appeals and indicated that permission to appeal to the House of Lords should be available on the principal questions.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2006] EWCA Civ 395. All appeals dismissed. The decision concerning the relevance of the location of Y’s abuse was reversed, but the claim remained unsuccessful on the governing limitation and vicarious-liability principles.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division — Jack J dismissed A’s appeal from the striking out of her claim: [2005] EWHC 2161 (QB).
• Southend County Court — His Honour Judge Yelton dismissed H’s claims against Suffolk County Council.
• Mayor’s City of London County Court — His Honour Judge Cotran dismissed X and Y’s claims against the London Borough of Wandsworth.