A v Hoare

An intentional assault claim seeking damages for psychiatric injury is an action founded on tort subject to the six-year limitation period in section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980. The personal-injury provisions in sections 11 and 33 do not apply merely because psychiatric injury is claimed. The restriction is compatible with Article 6 of the Convention where it pursues legitimate aims and bears a reasonable relationship of proportionality to those aims. A national court applies the same proportionality approach as the European Court and cannot substitute its own policy view within the State’s margin of appreciation.

The claimant alleged that the defendant had attempted to rape her in 1988 and sought damages for assault and battery and psychiatric injury. She commenced proceedings in 2004 after the defendant won a substantial lottery prize, because he had previously been unable to satisfy any judgment. Master Eyre struck out the claim on 14 June 2005, holding that it was barred by limitation. The claimant appealed, arguing that section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980, together with section 33, should apply or that section 2 was incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention.

The central issue was whether the claim was governed by the non-extendable six-year period for actions founded on tort, and whether applying that period disproportionately restricted access to a court.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The claim was for intentional assault and psychiatric injury. It was not a negligence claim, and the cause of action accrued on the date of the assault.
2. Under Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 499, claims for injury arising from deliberate assault, including indecent assault, fall within section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980. They are therefore subject to a six-year limitation period which cannot be extended under section 33. The decision had been applied by the Court of Appeal in KR and Others v Bryn Alyn Community [2003] Q.B. 1441.
3. The claimant’s reliance on Article 6 failed. The European Court’s decision in Stubbings v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 213 established that the limitation regime pursued legitimate aims and was proportionate. The margin of appreciation means that the legislature may choose how access to court is restricted, provided that the restriction is proportionate. A national court has no wider power than the European Court to substitute its own view of the appropriate policy.
4. The later Law Commission report and its proposed reform of limitation law did not show that the margin of appreciation had expired. The passage of four years without implementation was insufficient to alter the conclusion reached in Stubbings v United Kingdom.
5. A certificate for a direct appeal to the House of Lords under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 was refused because the proportionality issue had not been fully argued or considered. Any further appeal therefore lay, subject to permission, to the Court of Appeal under Rule 52.13. The time for serving notice and applying for permission was extended under Rule 52.4(2)(a).

High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Master Eyre struck out the claim on 14 June 2005 as barred by limitation. The High Court dismissed the claimant’s appeal.