Adams (FC) (Respondent) v. Bracknell Forest Borough Council (Appellants)

A failure to diagnose a congenital learning difficulty and provide suitable teaching may constitute personal injury where its untreated effects impair mental functioning, although the defendant did not cause the underlying condition.

Constructive knowledge under section 14(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 is assessed mainly objectively. The claimant is placed in the situation of a person suffering the relevant injury, but peculiarities of character, intelligence, shyness or embarrassment generally do not postpone time. A significant injury ordinarily creates an expectation of reasonable inquiry and appropriate expert advice. Any claim that the injury itself inhibited inquiry requires an evidential foundation.

When considering section 33, the court balances prejudice and proportionality. Loss of records, faded recollections, expense and the likely value of a stale claim may justify refusing disapplication.

Mr Adams alleged that a local education authority negligently failed to identify and address his dyslexia while he attended its schools between 1981 and 1988. He claimed that appropriate assessment and teaching would have improved his literacy and avoided disadvantages in employment and psychological conditions including depression, panic attacks and social phobia.

He attained full age in March 1990 but commenced proceedings in June 2002. On a preliminary issue, the county court held that his date of knowledge was not before November 1999. The Court of Appeal upheld that conclusion in [2003] EWCA Civ 706.

The council's appeal raised three issues: whether the action included a claim for personal injury within sections 11 and 38(1) of the Limitation Act 1980; when constructive knowledge arose under section 14(3); and whether the limitation period should be disapplied under section 33.

1. The House unanimously allowed the appeal and dismissed the action. Lord Hoffmann delivered the leading speech. Lord Phillips and Lord Scott agreed with his conclusions and his principally objective construction of section 14(3). Lord Walker agreed with the movement towards objectivity while cautioning against a universal formula. Baroness Hale agreed in the result but expressed a qualified view about the possible relevance of some personal characteristics.

2. Per Lord Hoffmann, the claim included damages for personal injury within sections 11 and 38(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. A defendant need not have caused the congenital condition. Failure to diagnose dyslexia and mitigate its effects through suitable teaching could leave an impairment of mental functioning untreated. The analogy with a negligent failure to treat a pre-existing physical injury was sound. The reasoning and result in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 and Anderton v Clwyd County Council, reported at the same citation, supported that classification. Lord Scott reached the same conclusion because the pleaded psychological consequences were capable of being impairments of mental condition. Baroness Hale agreed that the claim involved such an impairment.

3. Per Lord Hoffmann, with Lord Phillips and Lord Scott agreeing, section 14(3) imposes a mainly objective standard. The claimant is assumed to have suffered the relevant injury and to be placed in the same situation, but peculiar character, intelligence, shyness or embarrassment are generally excluded. A person aware of a sufficiently serious personal injury is ordinarily expected to show reasonable curiosity about its causes and to seek appropriate expert advice. The reasoning in Forbes v Wandsworth Health Authority [1997] QB 402 was preferred. Earlier dicta describing the test as subjective were disapproved because the section 33 discretion had altered the statutory balance between claimants and defendants.

4. The injury itself may be relevant if it would reasonably inhibit the acquisition of information. That proposition required evidence. There was no evidential basis for finding that a person with untreated dyslexia would generally be unable to disclose literacy difficulties to a medical adviser. The respondent knew that serious psychological problems were rooted in his inability to read and write. Reasonable inquiry would have led to appropriate advice much earlier. His constructive date of knowledge was therefore well before 25 June 1999.

5. Section 33 was not disapplied. The claimant bore the burden of showing that continuation was equitable. The council's educational records had been destroyed, recollections were poor and the claim would be expensive to defend. The likely award was relatively modest and no special feature concerning the delay displaced the substantial prejudice to the council. The guidance in Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] PIQR P128 was applied.

6. Lord Hoffmann added that, where limitation is tried as a preliminary issue, the parties should make clear whether incidental factual findings are to remain open at the merits stage. This was case-management guidance rather than a ground of decision.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the council's appeal unanimously, set aside the decisions below and dismissed the action: [2004] UKHL 29.
2. Court of Appeal: Upheld the county court's conclusion that the claimant's date of knowledge was not before November 1999. It considered that the action had been commenced within the limitation period: [2003] EWCA Civ 706.
3. Torquay and Newton Abbot County Court: His Honour Judge Vincent determined the date of knowledge as a preliminary issue and held that it was not before 19 November 1999.