A v Hoare

Under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, the court has a wide discretion to disapply the limitation period in a personal injury claim where equity requires it. The discretion requires a balancing of all the circumstances, including the length and reasons for delay, evidential prejudice, the parties’ conduct, disability, promptness, and advice obtained. No single factor is decisive. In an exceptional case, it may be reasonable for a claimant not to sue an impecunious defendant when recovery would have been futile, particularly where the impecuniosity resulted from the tort itself. A later unexpected change in the defendant’s financial position may justify proceedings, provided the claimant then acts promptly. The seriousness of the tort, undisputed liability, and the availability of sufficiently cogent evidence may outweigh substantial delay.

The claimant sought damages for psychiatric injury caused by the defendant’s attempted rape in 1988. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The claimant did not bring civil proceedings within the limitation period because the defendant was imprisoned and had no realistic ability to satisfy a judgment. Proceedings were commenced after the defendant’s release and unexpected lottery win.

The House of Lords held that claims arising from trespass to the person fell within section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980, overruling the contrary approach in Stubbings v Webb, and remitted the case for consideration under section 33. The issue before the High Court was whether the limitation period should be disapplied.

1. The court exercised its discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 in favour of the claimant and disapplied the limitation period. The claim could proceed.

2. Section 33 confers a wide and unfettered discretion, subject to the court acting judicially. The matters listed in section 33(3) are important but exemplary. The court must consider all relevant circumstances and conduct a balancing exercise. The burden rests on the claimant, and an order is an exceptional indulgence to be granted only where equity demands it.

3. The delay was very long, but its principal reason was genuine and understandable. It was reasonable for the claimant not to pursue a civil claim while the defendant was serving life imprisonment, was penniless, and could not satisfy a judgment. Requiring her to obtain a worthless judgment merely in case the defendant later acquired money would have been illogical, inequitable, and wasteful of resources. The claimant acted promptly once the defendant’s circumstances changed.

4. The defendant’s conviction meant that liability for the assault itself was not in issue. Delay could affect the cogency of evidence concerning causation, especially historic psychiatric symptoms, but that prejudice was modest. The later recurrence of PTSD in 2004 remained capable of effective expert assessment. The absence of defendant conduct requiring consideration and the absence of claimant disability were neutral.

5. The underlying tort was exceptionally serious. The defendant’s impecuniosity resulted from the tort and his consequent imprisonment. That unusual combination, followed by an unexpected lottery win, made the case exceptional. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board payment and possible additional CFA liability were factors in the defendant’s favour, but carried little weight. A section 33 decision turns on its particular facts and establishes no automatic rule for other cases.

1. House of Lords — In [2008] UKHL 6; [2008] 2 WLR 311, the House held that section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980 applied to the claim and remitted the case for determination under section 33.

2. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) — The limitation period was disapplied and the claim was permitted to proceed.