Thames Valley Police, R (on the application of) v The Police Appeals Tribunal & Anor

A professional disciplinary panel may admit hearsay evidence where its procedural rules confer a broad discretion, but the evidence should ordinarily be called only where necessary in the interests of justice. A tribunal reviewing the panel’s decision must distinguish procedural unfairness from speculation that admissible evidence unconsciously influenced the panel. Where the panel clearly states that it disregarded the evidence, that reasoning should be accepted unless there is evidence to the contrary. An appeal tribunal cannot set aside a reasoned credibility finding merely because other, uncharged incidents were not determined or involved conflicting recollections. The statutory test is whether the finding was unreasonable, not whether it was arguably wrong or severe. A judicial review court may quash an appeal tribunal’s decision and remit only those issues requiring determination.

A police disciplinary panel found four allegations of sexual harassment or bullying proved against a detective inspector and treated them as gross misconduct warranting immediate dismissal. It also found a separate CCTV-related allegation proved and imposed management advice.

The Police Appeals Tribunal allowed the appeal against the first allegation. It held that hearsay evidence about complaints allegedly made by other officers should not have been admitted, that the panel might have been unconsciously influenced by it, and that the panel should have made findings about three uncharged incidents.

The Chief Constable sought judicial review of that decision. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had lawfully assessed the admission and effect of the hearsay evidence, and whether it was entitled to interfere with the panel’s findings of fact and credibility.

1. The claim succeeded. The Police Appeals Tribunal’s decision allowing the appeal against the first allegation was quashed.
2. Under regulations 23(3) and 33(1) and (8) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, the disciplinary panel had a wide discretion over the admission of evidence and the conduct of proceedings. That discretion did not exclude hearsay. Nevertheless, where alleged complainants were themselves to give evidence and did not confirm having complained, it would have been preferable to hear them first. In the circumstances, the hearsay evidence was likely to have been unnecessary.
3. The Tribunal was not entitled to infer that the panel had been unconsciously influenced or biased by evidence which the panel expressly stated it had disregarded. In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the panel had failed to follow its stated reasoning, its explanation had to be accepted.
4. The three uncharged incidents, considered with the unproved allegation concerning a rebuke, showed no more than conflicting recollections about relatively minor matters. They could not reasonably undermine the panel’s carefully reasoned conclusion that the complainant was truthful and reliable in her core account.
5. The Tribunal’s reasoning was therefore flimsy and illogical. Its statutory review of reasonableness did not permit it to substitute speculation for evidence or to reopen findings which could not reasonably be upset on the statutory grounds.
6. The finding that the proved conduct amounted to gross misconduct was itself within the broad range of reasonable decisions. That issue was not remitted. The appeal was remitted to the same Tribunal, if possible, to determine the appeal against the sanction of immediate dismissal. The claimant was awarded costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

• Police Appeals Tribunal: allowed the appeal against the finding of gross misconduct on allegation 1 and quashed the dismissal sanction; dismissed the appeal concerning the CCTV allegation.
• High Court (Administrative Court): quashed the Tribunal’s decision on allegation 1, upheld the gross misconduct finding, and remitted the sanction issue to the Tribunal.