Squire v Thames Valley Police & Anor (R. on the Application of)

On an appeal from a specialist police disciplinary appeal tribunal, the court must identify a proper evidential and legal basis before interfering with the disciplinary panel’s assessment. A panel may admit hearsay, although it is generally prudent to hear available makers or witnesses first. Where the panel expressly puts prejudicial hearsay out of account, an appellate tribunal cannot infer reliance on it without clear evidence. Apparent bias requires facts capable of supporting the perception of a fair-minded and informed observer; disagreement with the panel’s evidential approach is insufficient. A tribunal need not address every peripheral evidential point. Once supervisory sexual harassment and the relevant aggravating circumstances are proved, describing the misconduct as gross is not inappropriate merely because the sanction remains to be determined.

Michael Squire, a detective inspector, appealed to the Police Appeals Tribunal against a disciplinary panel’s findings that he had committed gross misconduct by sexually harassing a police staff member and against his dismissal. The PAT allowed the appeal, finding the panel’s acceptance of the complainant’s evidence unreasonable, treating the admission of hearsay as erroneous, and finding apparent bias.

On judicial review, Mitting J allowed the Chief Constable’s application, holding that the PAT had exceeded its proper role, while remitting the sanction issue to the PAT: [2015] EWHC 3358 (Admin). Squire appealed. The Chief Constable cross-appealed against remission of sanction. The central issues were whether the PAT had identified a lawful basis to interfere with the panel’s findings and whether dismissal was inevitable.

1. The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld Mitting J’s conclusions and found the PAT’s decision unsustainable.
2. The panel was entitled to admit hearsay evidence. It would have been the clearer and more logical case-management course to hear the available quoted witnesses first and, if they did not support the hearsay account, not to admit it. That sequencing decision nevertheless did not undermine the panel’s ultimate analysis.
3. The panel expressly stated that it placed the unsupported hearsay out of account. The PAT could not go behind that disavowal without a clear evidential basis. The admission of the evidence therefore did not make the proceedings procedurally unfair.
4. The PAT had no proper basis for finding apparent bias. The panel’s approach concerned the admissibility and weight of hearsay, not bias. There were no facts from which a fair-minded and informed observer could conclude that there was a danger or risk of bias.
5. The ancillary incidents were peripheral and of, at most, marginal evidential value. A tribunal is not required to set out every evidential or argued point. The PAT could not reasonably conclude that those incidents undermined the complainant’s cogent core account, still less that the panel was bound to disbelieve it or treat her as unreliable.
6. Under PAT Rules 2012, rule 4(4)(a) and (c), the specialist appellate tribunal had no basis for impugning the panel’s findings. Once the primary facts were proved, the panel was entitled to find gross misconduct, having regard to the officer’s supervisory rank, pastoral responsibility, abuse of position and the complainant’s prolonged uncertainty and fear. Dismissal was likely, but not necessarily inevitable, so remission of sanction was proper.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed Squire’s appeal and the Chief Constable’s cross-appeal.
2. Administrative Court: Mitting J allowed the Chief Constable’s application for judicial review of the PAT’s decision and remitted the sanction issue to the PAT: [2015] EWHC 3358 (Admin).
3. Police Appeals Tribunal: allowed Squire’s disciplinary appeal, finding the panel’s acceptance of the complainant’s evidence unreasonable, the hearsay treatment erroneous, and apparent bias established.
4. Disciplinary panel: found Squire guilty of gross misconduct and dismissed him.