RMP Construction Services Ltd v Chalcroft Ltd

In adjudication enforcement proceedings, a misdescription of the contractual route does not deprive an adjudicator of jurisdiction where every realistically arguable contractual route is a construction contract requiring adjudication under the same statutory scheme. The court distinguishes jurisdictional objections from complaints that the adjudicator reached the wrong substantive answer. A possible error of law about the applicable contractual payment provisions is ordinarily a substantive error and does not prevent enforcement. The court will avoid a formalistic approach which treats identification of every contractual term as a condition of jurisdiction, particularly where the dispute arose during one continuing contracting process.

RMP Construction Services Ltd v Chalcroft Ltd concerned enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision awarding RMP £258,760.67 plus VAT and fees for construction works. RMP said the contract was formed by a 5 December 2014 email. Chalcroft advanced alternative contractual routes involving a letter of intent, subsequent emails, or an April 2015 sub-contract order incorporating JCT terms.

The parties agreed that each arguable route was a construction contract to which the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 applied, and that the Scheme for Construction Contracts supplied the same adjudicator-appointment procedure. The central issue was whether a possible difference in the substantive payment outcome made the misidentification of the contractual route a jurisdictional defect preventing summary enforcement.

1. Summary judgment granted. RMP was entitled to enforce the adjudicator’s award. Judgment was entered for £318,529.30, including the adjudicator’s fee and VAT, with interest of £7,231.15 and continuing interest at £60.26 per day until further order.
2. The court distinguished between jurisdiction and substantive correctness. Reasonably arguable challenges to jurisdiction may prevent enforcement, but an alleged error of fact, law or procedure in reaching the substantive answer ordinarily does not.
3. The adjudicator had jurisdiction on every contractual route advanced. Each route involved a construction contract within s 108 of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, no nominating body was specified, and the Scheme for Construction Contracts governed appointment. The dispute referred was the amount owing under interim application no 8.
4. The alternative contractual routes formed part of one continuing contracting process. Treating RMP’s possibly imperfect identification of the operative contractual provisions as fatal would create the formalistic obstacle course rejected in Purton v Kilker.
5. The possible effect of the April 2015 sub-contract order on payment went to the substantive outcome, not jurisdiction. If the adjudicator had applied the wrong contractual provisions, that would be an error of law in deciding the referred dispute. It did not involve deciding a different dispute, excess of jurisdiction, bias, breach of natural justice or another recognised enforcement defect.
6. The court also held that the letter of intent did not provide an operative payment mechanism. Its reference to 42 days conflicted with the suggested 28-day mechanism, the valuation schedule was absent, and payment was made conditional on main-contract valuations in a manner inconsistent with s 110(1A). The Scheme therefore supplied the relevant payment and pay-less-notice timetable.