Smith v Huertas

Recognition or enforcement of a judgment under the Judgments Regulation may be refused on public-policy grounds only in an exceptional case involving an obvious and fundamental breach of the legal order of the enforcing state. The enforcing court must not review the foreign judgment’s substance or findings of fact and law.

The court must also consider whether the state of origin provided adequate remedies for the alleged unfairness, bias or procedural defect. A party should ordinarily pursue those remedies before challenging enforcement abroad. A strong presumption applies that courts of another Member State complied with Article 6 rights. Failure to use available remedies is highly material. It may prevent reliance on public policy at the enforcement stage.

Dr Smith sought a declaration that a judgment of the Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence dated 26 March 2013 was not entitled to recognition or enforcement in England under Article 34.1 of the Judgments Regulation. He alleged breaches of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, procedural unfairness and actual or apparent bias in French criminal and partie civile proceedings.

Mr Huertas applied for summary judgment and a declaration that the French judgment was recognised and enforceable. The central issues were whether Dr Smith had a realistic prospect of establishing that enforcement would be manifestly contrary to English public policy, and whether the alleged defects should first have been pursued through remedies in France or before the European Court of Human Rights.

1. Summary judgment and declaration. Dr Smith’s claim had no realistic prospect of success. Judgment was entered for Mr Huertas on the claim and counterclaim. The APCA judgment of 26 March 2013, together with its supplemental judgment of 8 October 2013, was declared recognised and enforceable in the English courts.
2. Applicable threshold. Article 34.1 of the Judgments Regulation had to be read with Article 36. Recognition could be refused only in an exceptional case where enforcement was manifestly contrary to public policy, involving a manifest breach of a fundamental rule or right. The English court could not review the substance of the French judgment or reassess its findings of fact and law.
3. Remedies in the state of origin. The court adopted the principles in Krombach v Bamberski, Case 7/98, Renault SA v Maxicar SpA, Case C-38/98, and Interdesco S.A. v Nullifire Ltd [1992] ILPR 97. The French legal system provided appeals and other remedies for the complaints made. The availability, and non-use, of those remedies were highly material. The enforcing court was less well placed than the French appellate courts to assess alleged unfairness or bias in French proceedings.
4. Complaints made. The complaints concerning delay, the failure to interview Dr Smith, the insolvency date, the evidence, the alleged concealment of a repayment, communications with a co-accused, the acquittal of that co-accused, the conduct of the hearing, the interpreter, the sentence and the alleged bias either challenged the substance of the APCA judgment or could and should have been raised in France. The APCA had taken account of the repayment and had given independent reasoning concerning the insolvency date. The disputed facts about the hearing could not alter the result because the complaints had not been recorded or pursued through the available French remedies.
5. Article 6 and bias. A strong presumption applied that the procedures of another Contracting State complied with Article 6. The alleged procedural defects were not shown to have caused an infringement sufficiently serious to make enforcement unacceptable in England. Applying Porter v Magill [2012] 2 AC 357 did not establish apparent bias on the evidence.
6. Summary judgment test. There was no material dispute requiring a trial. The only factual dispute concerned the APCA hearing, but it could not provide a viable public-policy defence. Costs were to follow the event, subject to further submissions if required.