The London Steam-Ship Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain (M/T PRESTIGE)

The public-policy exception to recognition of a judgment under Article 34(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 is exceptional and must be construed strictly. Recognition may be refused only where it would plainly or obviously breach an essential rule of the enforcing state’s legal order or a fundamental right recognised there. The exception does not permit review of the foreign judgment’s substance or the accuracy of its factual and legal conclusions. A party should ordinarily use the remedies available in the state of origin before resisting recognition. Unincorporated treaty obligations do not themselves create domestic public policy rights. The exception was not engaged by alleged breaches of criminal fair-trial rights affecting a different person, especially where the enforcing party had not asserted its own rights and the complaints had been considered or could have been raised in the state of origin.

The London Steam-Ship Mutual Insurance Association Ltd appealed against an ex parte registration order made by Master Cook under Article 43 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. The order registered a Spanish judgment imposing civil liability on the Club, subject to a USD 1 billion policy limit, for pollution arising from the loss of the M/T Prestige.

The Club argued that recognition should be refused under Article 34(1) because enforcement would violate fundamental rights, including rights under the ICCPR, the ECHR and the EU Charter. The judgment determined that human-rights public-policy issue. Other issues concerning irreconcilability and res judicata were referred, or proposed to be referred, to the CJEU.

1. Article 34(1). The public-policy exception must be interpreted strictly and used only in exceptional circumstances. Recognition may be refused only where it would constitute a manifest breach of an essential rule of law or a fundamental right in the enforcing state. Article 36 prohibits review of the foreign judgment’s substance, including the accuracy of its findings of fact or law.
2. Article 14(5) ICCPR. The provision was not incorporated into English law and did not itself establish a fundamental principle of English public policy. In any event, the alleged right belonged to the Master, not the Club, and the Club had not used available remedies to protect its own rights.
3. Fair-trial complaints. Allegations concerning new factual findings on appeal and inequality of arms had been raised before the Spanish courts and the ECtHR. They could not be re-litigated through the enforcement process. There was, in any event, a bona fide and significant argument that the Spanish Supreme Court had made a legal evaluation rather than new material factual findings. The complaints did not make enforcement plainly or obviously contrary to public policy.
4. Arbitrariness and A1P1. The Club’s criticisms of the Spanish Supreme Court’s application of the CLC were invitations to review the accuracy of its legal and factual conclusions. That was impermissible under Articles 36 and 45(2). The Club had not shown that the Spanish judgment lacked any process of fact-finding or legal analysis, or that it had exhausted remedies concerning its own alleged rights.
5. The Club’s case under Article 34(1) based on alleged breaches of fundamental rights was rejected. The appropriate order was to be addressed after the outcome of the related reference and appeal concerning the remaining issues.

1. High Court (Commercial Court) — The Club appealed under Article 43 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 against Master Cook’s ex parte registration order of 28 May 2019. The court rejected the Article 34(1) human-rights public-policy ground.
2. Earlier procedural history — Hamblen J enforced the arbitration award under sections 66, 67 and 72 of the Arbitration Act 1996; the Court of Appeal upheld that decision in [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 33. The court’s determination of other appeal issues awaited related CJEU proceedings.