Williams v London Borough of Waltham Forest

Statutory review of experimental traffic orders is concerned with legality, not the merits of the traffic strategy. The statutory procedure did not require consultation before experimental orders were made where the underlying strategy and detailed scheme had already been extensively consulted upon. Whether further consultation was procedurally fair is fact-sensitive.

A decision not to hold a public inquiry into experimental orders is reviewable only on the ordinary public-law grounds, and intervention will be unusual, particularly where the experiment itself permits evidence and objections to be gathered. A statement of reasons need only give a concise explanation of the proposed orders. The authority’s compliance with section 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 may be assessed from the whole decision-making history, not merely that statement.

Sarah Williams, representing E17 Streets4All, sought statutory review under paragraph 35 of schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 of 20 experimental traffic orders made by the London Borough of Waltham Forest for Walthamstow Village.

The orders formed part of the Council’s phased Mini-Holland scheme. The challenge alleged inadequate consultation, irrational refusal to hold a public inquiry, irrationality in the merits and data relied upon, failure to comply with section 122 of the Act, and breach of the network management duty. The central issues were whether the orders were legally invalid or whether relevant statutory requirements had been breached.

1. Claim dismissed. The court refused permission to appeal on ground 5. The Claimant was ordered to pay costs of £10,000 plus VAT within 28 days.
2. Statutory review under paragraph 35 of schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 does not permit the High Court to determine the technical merits of experimental traffic orders. The Claimant had to establish legal invalidity, breach of a relevant requirement, or irrationality.
3. The Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 imposed no consultation requirement before making the experimental orders. The Council had already consulted on the wider strategy and the detailed Walthamstow Village proposals. It was lawful to implement the strategy in phases, and procedural fairness did not require the consultation to be repeated.
4. Following R (Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey [2014] 1 WLR 3947, consultation fairness was fact-sensitive. The consultation had clearly identified the proposed road closures, allowed alternative suggestions, and was not shown to have prevented any substantial point from being raised.
5. The Council had a discretion whether to hold a public inquiry. In the context of temporary experimental orders, a decision not to hold one would be unlawful only in unusual or exceptional circumstances. The Council had considered the issue, had sufficient information, and could gather further information during the experiment. Its decision was not irrational. The court adopted the context-sensitive approach in AA & Sons v Slough Borough Council [2014] EWHC 1127 (Admin).
6. The complaints about the necessity of the measures and the quality of traffic data were merits challenges. They did not demonstrate irrationality, particularly in light of the decision-maker’s local and specialist knowledge.
7. Section 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 required the Council, so far as practicable, to have regard to the statutory matters while securing the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic and suitable parking. The duty could be satisfied expressly or by implication. The court could examine the whole decision-making history, including consultation material, reports and contemporaneous documents.
8. The statement required by paragraph 2(d) of schedule 2 to the 1996 Regulations needed to provide a concise summary of the reasons for the proposed orders. It did not need to address every relevant consideration in detail. Any breach would also require proof of substantial prejudice. The Council had considered reasonable access, local amenities, air quality and traffic displacement, and had regard to its Air Quality Action Plan. No breach of section 122 or the network management duty was established.

The judgment is a first-instance decision. Permission to appeal was sought on ground 5 only and was refused. The Claimant was informed that any further application would need to formulate the proposed grounds clearly.