Williams & Ors (The Sustainable Totnes Action Group) v Devon County Council

A traffic regulation order may be challenged only on statutory vires or procedural grounds; the court must not re-determine the merits or substitute its assessment of evidence and weight for that of the traffic authority. Section 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 requires a local authority to balance the statutory objectives and listed considerations. In a complex case, the authority should record that analysis sufficiently clearly in its reasons. A public inquiry is required where an order restricts the passage of public service vehicles and a qualifying objection has been made. Failure to hold the inquiry substantially prejudiced the claimant’s interests, so the order was quashed.

The claimant, originally an unincorporated association and later represented by Jane Williams, challenged Devon County Council’s decision to make permanent an experimental traffic order affecting traffic flow, vehicle access and a community bus route in Totnes. The challenge was brought under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

The issues included the claimant’s standing, compliance with section 122 of the 1984 Act, consultation and consent requirements, the duty to hold a public inquiry under regulation 9 of the Local Authorities Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996, and whether any procedural failure substantially prejudiced the claimant.

1. Standing. At the date proceedings were issued, STAG was an unincorporated association. It had an identifiable membership, a history of concerted action, a common objective, a bank account, commissioned expert reports and instructed legal representatives. It was therefore a relevant person entitled to challenge the order under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The later incorporation of a company did not justify substituting that company as claimant.
2. Secretary of State consent. The restriction on vehicles exceeding 9.8 metres did not trigger the consent requirement in Schedule 9, paragraph 13(1)(a), because no relevant objection had been made by an owner, lessee or occupier of affected premises. Paragraph 13(3) was confined to experimental orders made under section 9 and did not apply to this permanent order.
3. Public inquiry. Bob the Bus was a public service vehicle. The order materially restricted its passage by preventing its former route and requiring a substantially longer double-loop journey. Objections had been made and, by regulation 23, were treated as objections to the permanent order. Regulation 9 therefore imposed a condition precedent requiring a public inquiry.
4. The failure to hold the inquiry was substantive, not a mere procedural formality. It deprived the claimant, bus users and the wider public of an opportunity to address matters including alternative traffic arrangements, public transport, access to premises, safety, congestion and local amenities. The claimant’s interests were substantially prejudiced within paragraph 36(1)(b) of Schedule 9.
5. Section 122. Section 122 required a balancing exercise between the statutory objectives in subsection (1) and the matters in subsection (2). Given the complexity of the competing evidence and issues, the authority’s reports and minutes did not show that the committee had directed its mind to that exercise. Had the public-inquiry ground not succeeded, the order would also have been vulnerable on this basis.
6. The remaining complaints largely invited the court to re-weigh evidence concerning safety, economic effects, congestion, public transport and alternative schemes. Those were merits questions for the elected authority. The order was nevertheless quashed because of the failure to hold the required public inquiry.