Houston v Director of Public Prosecutions

On an appeal by way of case stated, the High Court is confined to the four corners of the stated case. It cannot be supplemented by evidence or notes from the lower-court hearing.

For an adult defendant who knowingly fails to attend a magistrates’ court trial, proceeding in the defendant’s absence is the statutory default unless an acceptable reason for the absence is shown. The interests of justice remain controlling, but the statutory default materially affects the discretion to adjourn.

The prosecution and court are not generally required to adduce or investigate evidence which the absent defence could have deployed. The power to reopen proceedings under section 142(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 is a limited slip rule directed to rectifying mistakes.

The appellant was due to stand trial before Sefton Magistrates’ Court for assault by beating. He failed to attend, and the magistrates proceeded in his absence after refusing an adjournment. He was convicted, and a subsequent application under section 142(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to rehear the case was refused.

He appealed by way of case stated against both decisions. The stated questions concerned proceeding in his absence, the treatment of admissible character material, self-defence, good character, and the refusal to reopen the case. The central issues were the proper scope of those statutory powers and the material that could be considered on a case-stated appeal.

1. Appeals dismissed. An appeal by way of case stated determines questions of law and jurisdiction on the material within the stated case. Under Part 35.3 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, the case should identify the decision, questions of law, relevant facts and necessary evidential summary. Additional evidence and hearing notes cannot be used to supplement it. This approach was applied in Skipaway v Environment Agency [2006] EWHC 983 (Admin) and DSG Retail v Stockton on Tees Borough Council [2006] EWHC 3138 (Admin).

2. Section 11 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, as amended, makes proceeding in the absence of an adult defendant the default where the defendant is aware of the trial date, subject to the statutory qualifications, including an acceptable reason for non-attendance. The interests of justice must prevail, but the amendment materially affects the exercise of the discretion. The magistrates were entitled to refuse an adjournment.

3. The statutory scheme applies to proceedings commenced by charge as well as by information. The court relied on R (Drinkwater) v Solihull Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWHC 765 and R (Manchester Stipendiary Magistrate), ex parte Hill [1983] 1 AC 328. The general caution governing trials in absence identified in Regina v Jones [2002] UKHL 5, [2003] 1 AC 1 remained relevant, but the statutory amendment created a material distinction between magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court.

4. There was no obligation on the prosecution to adduce evidence which the defence had been permitted, but not required, to present. Nor was the court required to advance a positive defence case or investigate the detail of character evidence. The magistrates were nevertheless entitled to address self-defence on the evidence before them, including the appellant’s interview.

5. Section 142(2) is a narrowly confined power to reopen proceedings in the interests of justice. Its statutory heading accurately describes it as a power to rectify mistakes, generally treated as a slip rule. It does not provide a general means of relitigating an unsuccessful case. The court followed Regina v Croydon Youth Court, ex parte DPP [1997] 2 Cr.App.R 411, as applied in R (on the application of Williamson) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2012] 2 Cr App R 24 and DPP v Chajed [2013] 2 Cr.App.R 6.

The appellant appealed by way of case stated from the magistrates’ refusal to adjourn the trial and from the subsequent refusal to reopen the proceedings. Both appeals were dismissed by the Divisional Court.