Rathor, R (on the application of) v Southampton Magistrates Court

When deciding whether to try an accused in his absence, a magistrates’ court must assess the interests of justice in the whole circumstances. It must consider whether the absence was involuntary, the likely adjournment, legal representation, the accused’s ability to give instructions, and the disadvantage caused by his absence. A medical certificate may be inadequate, but cannot simply be disregarded. The court must give adequate reasons, particularly if it rejects an apparently genuine illness. Section 11 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 does not create an overriding presumption in favour of proceeding in the accused’s absence. The power under section 142 is broad enough to reopen a case where later evidence shows that the original decision would not have been made had the full facts been known, and the absence of those facts was not the defendant’s fault.

The claimant was the defendant in criminal proceedings for common assault and battery. After several adjournments unrelated to him, the trial was listed for 4 December 2017. He became acutely unwell the previous evening and, through his advocate, sought an adjournment. The District Judge refused and proceeded with the trial in his absence, relying principally on the inadequacy of the medical certificate and the age of the case.

A later application under section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 was also refused. The claimant sought judicial review of both decisions. The central issues were whether the District Judge had lawfully applied section 11 and the principles governing trial in absence, and whether the later medical evidence engaged section 142.

1. The claim succeeded. Both decisions were quashed and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted magistrates’ court.
2. Under section 11 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, the power to proceed in the absence of an adult defendant is subject to the interests of justice. The statutory starting point does not displace the qualification that the court must not proceed where there is an acceptable reason for the failure to appear.
3. The principles in R v Jones (Anthony) [2001] EWCA Crim 168 required consideration of all the circumstances. These included whether the absence was deliberate and voluntary, whether an adjournment might secure attendance, its likely length, legal representation, the ability to give instructions, and, most importantly, the disadvantage caused by the defendant’s inability to give evidence.
4. The District Judge treated the inadequate medical certificate and the desirability of a prompt trial as decisive. He did not explain how the competing factors had been balanced, or why proceeding in a case turning on one witness’s word against another’s was consistent with fairness. That was an error of law. A court may reject medical evidence, but it must address the evidence and explain why an apparently genuine illness is rejected as spurious or designed to frustrate the process.
5. The court also considered section 142. Its statutory test is whether reopening the case would be in the interests of justice. The narrow interpretation in Houston v Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] EWHC 4144 (Admin) was too restrictive. The later medical certificate established involuntary absence and showed that the earlier decision would not have been reached had the full facts been known. The claimant was not at fault for the absence of that evidence. This reasoning was unnecessary to the result because the original decision was already quashed.

First-instance judicial review of two decisions by District Judge Greenfield in the Southampton Magistrates’ Court. The High Court quashed both decisions and remitted the matter to a differently constituted magistrates’ court.