Ranger v The House of Lords Appointments Commission

Personal data processed for the purpose of conferring a life peerage falls within the exemption for data concerning the conferring by the Crown of any honour or dignity. The exemption is not subject to an implied public-interest qualification merely because the Freedom of Information Act 2000 contains a qualified exemption for related information. A statutory bright-line rule protecting confidentiality may be proportionate where frank information is important to the appointments process. The legislation must be applied as enacted.

Dr Raminder Ranger had unsuccessfully put himself forward for appointment as a non-party-political life peer. He brought a Part 8 claim against the House of Lords Appointments Commission seeking disclosure of unsolicited letters and other information relating to the consideration of his nomination. He did not challenge the outcome and accepted that the authors’ identities need not be disclosed.

The issues were whether the requested information was exempt under paragraph 3(b) of Schedule 7 to the Data Protection Act 1998; whether that exemption should carry an implied public-interest qualification; and whether it was incompatible with the Data Protection Directive or Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

1. The claim was dismissed on all points.

2. Assuming that the requested material was personal data, the conferring of a life peerage was the conferring of an honour or dignity within paragraph 3(b) of Schedule 7 to the Data Protection Act 1998. The language was neither ambiguous nor uncertain. The legislative history confirmed that the exemption was intended to apply to the granting of peerages. Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 made the Hansard material admissible if ambiguity existed.

3. The exemption was not subject to an implied public-interest balancing exercise. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998 adopted different exemption structures and had different purposes. The court was required to apply each enactment as made.

4. The domestic exemption was compatible with the Data Protection Directive. The confidentiality protected information supplied to the Commission and encouraged full and candid contributions. A bright-line rule supplied necessary certainty from the outset and was proportionate. The court applied the four-stage proportionality analysis identified in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, with reference also to de Frietas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69, Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167 and R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.

5. Article 8 of the Charter added nothing materially different. Transparency and the rule of law did not justify disclosure. The claim was dismissed.