Flint v Tittenso & Anor (Rev 1)

A deliberate use of a vehicle to drive at a person and then throw that person from the vehicle is a battery unless justified by lawful self-defence. Self-defence requires an honestly held and reasonably held belief in the necessity of force, followed by a reasonable and proportionate response, allowing for the pressure of the moment. The defence fails where the force is retaliatory or grossly exceeds the threat.

The defence of ex turpi causa in a battery claim is determined by causation, not by comparing the parties’ culpability. A claimant’s criminal conduct bars recovery for consequences caused by that conduct, or by foreseeable conduct within a joint criminal enterprise. It does not bar recovery where the injury is caused by the defendant’s voluntary commission of a different kind of serious crime.

The claimant was seriously injured after the first defendant drove a BMW while the claimant was on its bonnet and manoeuvred so as to throw him onto the road. The claimant alleged deliberate trespass to the person and battery. The defendants relied on self-defence, consent, and the public-policy defence expressed by the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio.

The court found that the claimant had behaved aggressively, had damaged the vehicle, and had contributed to the confrontation. It nevertheless found that the first defendant deliberately drove towards him, carried him on the bonnet, accelerated and swerved to dislodge him. The central questions were whether those acts constituted battery, whether they were justified by self-defence, and whether the claimant’s own criminal conduct barred recovery.

1. Battery. The claimant proved deliberate acts directed at him. Driving towards him caused him to end up on the bonnet, and the subsequent driving and swerving deliberately subjected him to force. Under Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237, the act, rather than the injury, must be intentional. Hostility is a question of fact and may be inferred from the circumstances. The conduct was therefore battery unless justified.
2. Self-defence. The first defendant had to establish the defence on the balance of probabilities. The relevant questions were whether he honestly believed force was necessary, whether that belief was reasonably held, and whether the force used was reasonable or proportionate. The approach in R v Keane [2010] EWCA Crim 2514 required allowance for decisions made in the agony of the moment, but did not justify force which was retaliatory. The first defendant could have reversed away and summoned the police. Driving at the claimant was not defensive. Even if the claimant had reached the bonnet without unlawful force, accelerating and swerving to throw him off was disproportionate. The defence failed.
3. Illegality. The court applied the causation approach identified in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1339. The issue was whether the injury was caused by the claimant’s criminal conduct, rather than merely occasioned by it. The claimant’s conduct did not cause injuries inflicted by the first defendant’s separate and serious criminal violence. The analogy with a knife attack was apt. The claimant’s claim was therefore not barred by ex turpi causa.
4. There was judgment for the claimant against the first defendant. No order was made between the defendants. Costs and case-management directions were to be agreed.